The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic
This study examines the reasons why the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have been unable to reach an agreement for the distribution of the Total Allowable Catch for Atlantic mackerel. Whereas the allocation previously was decided by the long-standing coastal states, the EU...
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Universitetet i Tromsø
2011
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528 |
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ftunivtroemsoe:oai:munin.uit.no:10037/3528 2024-06-02T08:06:22+00:00 The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl 2011-05-13 https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528 eng eng Universitetet i Tromsø University of Tromsø https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528 URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_3249 Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) openAccess Copyright 2011 The Author(s) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0 VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929 VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929 FSK-3910 Master thesis Mastergradsoppgave 2011 ftunivtroemsoe 2024-05-07T08:43:25Z This study examines the reasons why the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have been unable to reach an agreement for the distribution of the Total Allowable Catch for Atlantic mackerel. Whereas the allocation previously was decided by the long-standing coastal states, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, changes in the mackerel’s migration pattern in a northward direction has led to Icelandic and Faroese requests for a larger portion of the resource. The “mackerel conflict” breaks out in 2010 and entails the use of sanctions as well as the setting of unilateral quotas in addition to those following from the coastal state agreement. The combined quota demands far exceed sustainable harvesting levels and will by all likelihood lead to overexploitation. The research methods were qualitative and involved the application of two-level game theory and the consideration of “win-sets” to explain the absence of co-operative management. The main finding was that the pelagic fishers effectively enjoy veto power over the outcome of the negotiations, in particular in fishery-dependent Iceland and the Faroe Islands, but to a large extent in Norway as well. Also in the EU the affected fishers have a decisive influence, although only in political terms. The parties’ many attempts at influencing each other’s positions have so far had no discernable effects and the situation begins to bear resemblance to a “tragedy of the commons”. Key words: Atlantic mackerel, European Union, Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands, TAC, quotas, conflict, two-level games, tragedy of the commons. Master Thesis Faroe Islands Iceland North East Atlantic University of Tromsø: Munin Open Research Archive Faroe Islands Norway Tac ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500) |
institution |
Open Polar |
collection |
University of Tromsø: Munin Open Research Archive |
op_collection_id |
ftunivtroemsoe |
language |
English |
topic |
VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929 VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929 FSK-3910 |
spellingShingle |
VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929 VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929 FSK-3910 Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic |
topic_facet |
VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929 VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929 FSK-3910 |
description |
This study examines the reasons why the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have been unable to reach an agreement for the distribution of the Total Allowable Catch for Atlantic mackerel. Whereas the allocation previously was decided by the long-standing coastal states, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, changes in the mackerel’s migration pattern in a northward direction has led to Icelandic and Faroese requests for a larger portion of the resource. The “mackerel conflict” breaks out in 2010 and entails the use of sanctions as well as the setting of unilateral quotas in addition to those following from the coastal state agreement. The combined quota demands far exceed sustainable harvesting levels and will by all likelihood lead to overexploitation. The research methods were qualitative and involved the application of two-level game theory and the consideration of “win-sets” to explain the absence of co-operative management. The main finding was that the pelagic fishers effectively enjoy veto power over the outcome of the negotiations, in particular in fishery-dependent Iceland and the Faroe Islands, but to a large extent in Norway as well. Also in the EU the affected fishers have a decisive influence, although only in political terms. The parties’ many attempts at influencing each other’s positions have so far had no discernable effects and the situation begins to bear resemblance to a “tragedy of the commons”. Key words: Atlantic mackerel, European Union, Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands, TAC, quotas, conflict, two-level games, tragedy of the commons. |
format |
Master Thesis |
author |
Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl |
author_facet |
Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl |
author_sort |
Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl |
title |
The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic |
title_short |
The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic |
title_full |
The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic |
title_fullStr |
The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic |
title_full_unstemmed |
The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic |
title_sort |
problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the north east atlantic |
publisher |
Universitetet i Tromsø |
publishDate |
2011 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528 |
long_lat |
ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500) |
geographic |
Faroe Islands Norway Tac |
geographic_facet |
Faroe Islands Norway Tac |
genre |
Faroe Islands Iceland North East Atlantic |
genre_facet |
Faroe Islands Iceland North East Atlantic |
op_relation |
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528 URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_3249 |
op_rights |
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) openAccess Copyright 2011 The Author(s) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0 |
_version_ |
1800751317829812224 |