The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic

This study examines the reasons why the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have been unable to reach an agreement for the distribution of the Total Allowable Catch for Atlantic mackerel. Whereas the allocation previously was decided by the long-standing coastal states, the EU...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl
Format: Master Thesis
Language:English
Published: Universitetet i Tromsø 2011
Subjects:
Tac
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528
id ftunivtroemsoe:oai:munin.uit.no:10037/3528
record_format openpolar
spelling ftunivtroemsoe:oai:munin.uit.no:10037/3528 2024-06-02T08:06:22+00:00 The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl 2011-05-13 https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528 eng eng Universitetet i Tromsø University of Tromsø https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528 URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_3249 Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) openAccess Copyright 2011 The Author(s) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0 VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929 VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929 FSK-3910 Master thesis Mastergradsoppgave 2011 ftunivtroemsoe 2024-05-07T08:43:25Z This study examines the reasons why the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have been unable to reach an agreement for the distribution of the Total Allowable Catch for Atlantic mackerel. Whereas the allocation previously was decided by the long-standing coastal states, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, changes in the mackerel’s migration pattern in a northward direction has led to Icelandic and Faroese requests for a larger portion of the resource. The “mackerel conflict” breaks out in 2010 and entails the use of sanctions as well as the setting of unilateral quotas in addition to those following from the coastal state agreement. The combined quota demands far exceed sustainable harvesting levels and will by all likelihood lead to overexploitation. The research methods were qualitative and involved the application of two-level game theory and the consideration of “win-sets” to explain the absence of co-operative management. The main finding was that the pelagic fishers effectively enjoy veto power over the outcome of the negotiations, in particular in fishery-dependent Iceland and the Faroe Islands, but to a large extent in Norway as well. Also in the EU the affected fishers have a decisive influence, although only in political terms. The parties’ many attempts at influencing each other’s positions have so far had no discernable effects and the situation begins to bear resemblance to a “tragedy of the commons”. Key words: Atlantic mackerel, European Union, Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands, TAC, quotas, conflict, two-level games, tragedy of the commons. Master Thesis Faroe Islands Iceland North East Atlantic University of Tromsø: Munin Open Research Archive Faroe Islands Norway Tac ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500)
institution Open Polar
collection University of Tromsø: Munin Open Research Archive
op_collection_id ftunivtroemsoe
language English
topic VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929
VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929
FSK-3910
spellingShingle VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929
VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929
FSK-3910
Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl
The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic
topic_facet VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920::Andre fiskerifag: 929
VDP::Agriculture and fishery disciplines: 900::Fisheries science: 920::Other fisheries disciplines: 929
FSK-3910
description This study examines the reasons why the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have been unable to reach an agreement for the distribution of the Total Allowable Catch for Atlantic mackerel. Whereas the allocation previously was decided by the long-standing coastal states, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, changes in the mackerel’s migration pattern in a northward direction has led to Icelandic and Faroese requests for a larger portion of the resource. The “mackerel conflict” breaks out in 2010 and entails the use of sanctions as well as the setting of unilateral quotas in addition to those following from the coastal state agreement. The combined quota demands far exceed sustainable harvesting levels and will by all likelihood lead to overexploitation. The research methods were qualitative and involved the application of two-level game theory and the consideration of “win-sets” to explain the absence of co-operative management. The main finding was that the pelagic fishers effectively enjoy veto power over the outcome of the negotiations, in particular in fishery-dependent Iceland and the Faroe Islands, but to a large extent in Norway as well. Also in the EU the affected fishers have a decisive influence, although only in political terms. The parties’ many attempts at influencing each other’s positions have so far had no discernable effects and the situation begins to bear resemblance to a “tragedy of the commons”. Key words: Atlantic mackerel, European Union, Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands, TAC, quotas, conflict, two-level games, tragedy of the commons.
format Master Thesis
author Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl
author_facet Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl
author_sort Hotvedt, Bjørnar Dahl
title The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic
title_short The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic
title_full The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic
title_fullStr The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic
title_full_unstemmed The problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the North East Atlantic
title_sort problem of sharing a common stock : an analysis of the mackerel conflict in the north east atlantic
publisher Universitetet i Tromsø
publishDate 2011
url https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528
long_lat ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500)
geographic Faroe Islands
Norway
Tac
geographic_facet Faroe Islands
Norway
Tac
genre Faroe Islands
Iceland
North East Atlantic
genre_facet Faroe Islands
Iceland
North East Atlantic
op_relation https://hdl.handle.net/10037/3528
URN:NBN:no-uit_munin_3249
op_rights Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0)
openAccess
Copyright 2011 The Author(s)
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0
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