DOKAZNI STANDARDI V IZVŠILNEM POSTOPKU - Gerlec, Barbara (B. Gerlec, 2013)
Diplomsko delo obravnava vprašanje dokaznih standardov v izvršilnem postopku. Sami temi se najprej približamo preko spoznavanja vsebin, ki predstavljajo izhodišče dokaznih standardov v izvršilnem postopku. To dosežemo preko spoznavanja samega izvršilnega postopka in dokaznih standardov ter načel in ostalih vsebin, ki jih ovsebinjajo, kot je na primer načelo proste presoje dokazov (pomeni, da je sodniku prepuščena presoja o tem ali neko dejstvo šteje za resnično ali ne, seveda ob upoštevanju celotnega postopka), ki izhaja iz načela materialne resnice oz. je materialna resnica njegova podlaga. Spoznati moramo tudi, kaj je sama resnica in kakšna stopnja spoznanja o resnici je potrebna, da v izvršilnem postopku dosežemo zadovoljivo stopnjo dokaznega standarda. Poleg resnice je pri obravnavi dokaznega standarda drug pomembni sestavni del proces dokazovanja. Stopnja resnice, ki jo mora sodnik med spoznanjem doseči, je stopnja resnice o tistih dejstvih, ki jih stranka v postopku dokazuje in na katera opira svoje zahtevke. Izpolnitev dokaznega standarda je namreč uspeh dokazovanja, je dokazanost. Pri tem se v precejšnji meri naslonimo na pravdni postopek, sestavni del katerega dokazni postopek je in njegove zakonske določbe, ki se smiselno uporabljajo v izvršilnem postopku. Tu se srečamo z dokaznim bremenom v povezavi s trditvenim bremenom. Za stranke je namreč izrednega pomena, katera od njiju mora dejstva zatrjevati, saj mora dejstva, ki jih zatrjuje, opreti na dokaze (dokazno breme), da se ne bi postopek končal z non-liquet situacijo, kar bi pomenilo neuspešen dokazni postopek. Ker se dokazi presojajo na podlagi dokaznih standardov, nas to privede do spoznanja, da nižje postavljeni dokazni standard pomeni večjo verjetnost, da bo dokazni postopek uspešno izpeljan in obratno, obratno pa velja za višji dokazni standard. Za uspešno razumevanje samega pojma dokaznega standarda in presojanja o tem, kakšna stopnja dokaznega standarda je primerna v posameznem primeru, je dobro, da poznamo tudi teorije, ki so jih oz. jih še zastopajo nekateri pravniki in teoretiki. Pri tem izstopa predvsem teorija korespondence (spoznanje je resnično, kadar subjektivna slika ustreza objektivni stvarnosti), ki je opremljena z vedno več kritikami novejših teorij. Ta teorija bi namreč pomenila zahtevo po visoki stopnji prepričanja, morda lahko govorimo celo o gotovosti dokaznega standarda, ki pa jo je, glede na vsa znana dejstva in nekatere nepremostljive ovire med procesom spoznanja, težko pričakovati ali celo zahtevati. Zato se večina novodobnih teoretikov zavzema za verjetnost kot stopnjo dokaznega standarda in celo njeno prožnost (od verjetnosti do pretežne verjetnosti). Ob obravnavi teme hitro pridemo do spoznanja, da je definicija samega dokaznega standarda problematična in velja za eno najbolj spornih vprašanj teorije in prakse ter kliče po vsebinski napolnitvi. Če se osredotočimo na izvršilni postopek, se tam v večini primerov zahteva dokazni standard verjetnost, sicer naj to še vedno ne bi veljalo za meritorne sklepe (odločanje o glavni stvari), je pa dokazni standard izrecno znižan v postopku za izdajo začasne odredbe. To določa tudi rek fumus boni iuris, saj naj bi to vodilo v bolj smiselne, hitre postopke in pomenilo večjo ekonomičnost. To v izvršilnem postopku izhaja iz še enega vidnejšega načela, načela stroge formalnelegalitete. Po tem načelu še enkrat več presojamo o smiselnosti postavljanja previsokih dokaznih standardov v izvršilnem postopku. Izvršilni sodnik je namreč pri svojemodločanju vezan na izvršilni naslov in mora v njem ugotovljeno terjatev upoštevati.Prepovedano je ponovno odločanje o že pravnomočni zadevi. Ponovno pa se vprašanje dokaznih standardov postavlja pri odločanju o pravnih sredstvih v izvršilnem postopku, predvsem pri odločanju o ugovoru dolžnika in ugovoru tretjega. Tudi tukaj je nova ureditev prinesla spremembe, s tem ko prepušča dokončno odločitev o tem izvršilnemu sodniku in ne napotuje več na pravdo, četudi gre za The undergraduate thesis deals with the matter of standard of proof in an enforcement procedure. We have described the topic through indentifying the content that represents the platform of standards of proof in the enforcement procedure. This can be achieved through indentifying the enforcement procedure itself, the standards of proof as well as principles and other content that makes them meaninful such as the principle of discretion of proof (which means that the judge can decide whether a fact is real or not in this case of course the whole procedure is taken into account), which derives from the principle of material truth i.e. the material truth is its platform. We have to understand what the truth itself is and what stage of notion aboutthe truth is required to reach a satisfactory stage of the standard of proof in the enforcement procedure. There is yet another important element besides the truth in the procedure of standard of proof, namely the process of proving. The stage of the truth that the judge requires to reach during the recognition is the stage of the truth about the facts that the party to a proceeding proves and bases its demand upon. The fulfilment of such standard of proof is namely the success of evidence-taking itself i.e. corroboration. At this point we have been using the civil proceedings and its statutory provisions thatare reasonably used in the enforcement procedure. We are now faced with the burden of proof in the connection with the burden of allegation. It is namely of extraordinary importance to the parties which one of them has to allege the facts, since he/she has to base its facts on proof (burden of proof) in order for the procedure not to be concluded in non-liquet situation, which would mean an unsuccessful evidence-taking procedure. Since the evidences are viewed based on the standards of proof the latter leads us to the notion that lower set standards of proof mean greater possibility that the evidence-taking procedure shall be successfully carried out and vice versa, i.e. the same notion is applicable for higher standard of proof. To fully understand the definition of the standard of proof itself as well as the view of which stage of standard of proof is appropriate in individual case it is good that we arealso aware of the theories which are or which were represented by some of the jurists and theorists. At this point the theory of correspondence stands out (the notion is real when the subjective image complies with its objective reality) which however has recieved more and more critics of the modern theories. This theory would namely indicate the demand for a high stage of belief, we could even say the certainty of the standard of proof, which is nevertheless hard to expect due to the all known facts and some of the obstacles that cannot be crossed. Therefore the majority of new age theorists talk in favour of probability in the sense of being the stage of the standard of proof and even in the favour of its flexibility (ranging from probability to substantial probability). In discussing the topic we quickly note that the definition of the standard of proof itself is problematic and is known as one of the most disputable issues of the theory and on court and is in desperate need of amendment. If we focus on the enforcement procedure the standard of proof which is demanded in most of the case is the probability. However this should still not hold true for decision on the merits (decision on the substance of the case). The standard of proof is extremely low, nevertheless, in the proceedings of issuing an interim decision. The latter is also identified by the phrase fumus boni iuris, since this should lead to more reasonable and fast procedures and to be more economical. This derives also from yet another more obvious principle in the enforcement procedure namely the principles of strict formal legality. Under this principle we judge once again about the sense of setting the standard of proof too high in the enforcement procedure. The judge is namely bound in hi