The UK EU Referendum and the move towards Brexit

• Published in: Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
• Main Authors: Raitio, Juha, Raulus, Helena
• Other Authors: Faculty of Law, Teachers' Academy
• Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
• Language: English
• Published: 2017
• Subjects: 513 Law; Greenland
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/233335

After the Brexit referendum in 23 June 2016 both the EU and the UK were led to a political turmoil on account of the winning of the Leave campaign. The withdrawal procedure should be triggered by the UK Government, but in accordance with the UK constitutional requirements. The main constitutional problem related to the competence of the Government to trigger the Article 50 TEU procedure to withdraw from the EU without any Act of Parliament beforehand. The judiciary had to solve this constitutional and political dilemma. The High Court of Justice ruled in 3 November 2016 that the Government does not have power under the royal prerogative to give notice pursuant to Article 50 TEU and thus the UK Parliament is needed to accept the notification, but this interpretation was controversial. Namely, the Belfast High court ruled later in November 2016 that neither the UK Parliament in London, nor the Northern Ireland assembly, had to be asked for their consent before the UK government triggers the Article 50 procedure. The High Court in London took it for granted that once the Article 50 procedure is triggered, it can’t be stopped, whereas the High court in Belfast did not agree on this. In December 2016 the case was heard in the UK Supreme Court, which delivered its ruling in 24 January 2017. The key questions related to the interpretation of the royal prerogative and the status of the devolved legislatures in the context of Brexit. As regards the prerogative powers the Supreme Court confirmed by a majority of 8 to 3 that the UK government cannot trigger Article 50 procedure without an authorizing Act of Parliament. What comes to the role of the devolved legislatures the Supreme Court ruled that they do not have a veto on the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. This controversy partly explains the delay to launch the withdrawal of the UK. Other reasons for the delay are more political and relate to the obscurity of the political will. The UK has to decide, what it tries to achieve in the negotiations for the future relationship with the EU. In this article a few models are explored, but the models provide only speculative value at the moment. The emphasis is on clarifying the possible ‘hard Brexit’ and ‘soft Brexit’ and reversed Greenland options. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyse the situation and the options that are open or could have been open for the UK rather than advocate any over another. In other words, it does not try to place any option over another and it does not aim to advocate what should happen next. Artikkelin tarkoituksena on taustoittaa sitä kehitystä, joka johti Britannian Brexit kansanäänestykseen sekä selvittää, millaisia ratkaisuvaihtoehtoja EU:n ja Britannian tulevien kauppasuhteiden osalta on nähtävissä. After the Brexit referendum in 23 June 2016 both the EU and the UK were led to a political turmoil on account of the winning of the Leave campaign. The withdrawal procedure should be triggered by the UK Government, but in accordance with the UK constitutional requirements. The main constitutional problem related to the competence of the Government to trigger the Article 50 TEU procedure to withdraw from the EU without any Act of Parliament beforehand. The judiciary had to solve this constitutional and political dilemma. The High Court of Justice ruled in 3 November 2016 that the Government does not have power under the royal prerogative to give notice pursuant to Article 50 TEU and thus the UK Parliament is needed to accept the notification, but this interpretation was controversial. Namely, the Belfast High court ruled later in November 2016 that neither the UK Parliament in London, nor the Northern Ireland assembly, had to be asked for their consent before the UK government triggers the Article 50 procedure. The High Court in London took it for granted that once the Article 50 procedure is triggered, it can’t be stopped, whereas the High court in Belfast did not agree on this. In December 2016 the case was heard in the UK Supreme Court, which delivered its ruling in 24 January 2017. The key questions related to the interpretation of the royal prerogative and the status of the devolved legislatures in the context of Brexit. As regards the prerogative powers the Supreme Court confirmed by a majority of 8 to 3 that the UK government cannot trigger Article 50 procedure without an authorizing Act of Parliament. What comes to the role of the devolved legislatures the Supreme Court ruled that they do not have a veto on the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. This controversy partly explains the delay to launch the withdrawal of the UK. Other reasons for the delay are more political and relate to the obscurity of the political will. The UK has to decide, what it tries to achieve in the negotiations for the future relationship with the EU. In this article a few models are explored, but the models provide only speculative value at the moment. The emphasis is on clarifying the possible ‘hard Brexit’ and ‘soft Brexit’ and reversed Greenland options. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyse the situation and the options that are open or could have been open for the UK rather than advocate any over another. In other words, it does not try to place any option over another and it does not aim to advocate what should happen next. Peer reviewed