Could the Icelandic banking collapse of 2008 have been prevented? The role of economists prior to the crisis
<jats:p>In 2008, the three main banks in Iceland collapsed. There is strong evidence that the banks would have become insolvent even without the subprime crisis. Yet there was a marked difference in opinion at the time about the viability of the Icelandic banks. A clean bill of health was give...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Article in Journal/Newspaper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Edward Elgar Publishing
2016
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256288 https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.229 |
Summary: | <jats:p>In 2008, the three main banks in Iceland collapsed. There is strong evidence that the banks would have become insolvent even without the subprime crisis. Yet there was a marked difference in opinion at the time about the viability of the Icelandic banks. A clean bill of health was given by the commissioned reports of Mishkin in 2007 and Portes in 2008, just prior to the collapse, whereas severe reservations about the Icelandic financial system were expressed by Wade, <jats:italic>inter alios</jats:italic>. These contrasting views were widely debated and may well have influenced both potential and actual foreign depositors in the banks. This paper analyses the disparate arguments put forward and contrasts it with the actual outcome. It considers the influence of economists in public policy debates and draws some methodological conclusions.</jats:p> This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Edward Elgar Publishing via https://doi.org/10.4337/ejeep.2016.03.06 |
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