An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act

This capstone provides an overview of the inadequate property rights framework that First Nation communities are subject to under the Indian Act, describes some of the major off-ramps to the Indian Act, and analyses the effectiveness of the First Nations Finance Authority (FNFA). First Nations of Ca...

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Main Author: Bhaidani, Tanzeel
Other Authors: Flanagan, Thomas
Format: Report
Language:English
Published: School of Public Policy 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111836
https://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37701
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spelling ftunivcalgary:oai:prism.ucalgary.ca:1880/111836 2023-08-27T04:09:24+02:00 An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act Bhaidani, Tanzeel Flanagan, Thomas 2019-09-05 application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111836 https://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37701 en eng School of Public Policy Faculty of Graduate Studies University of Calgary Bhaidani, T. (2019). An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act (Unpublished master's project). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37701 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111836 report 2019 ftunivcalgary https://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37701 2023-08-06T06:24:20Z This capstone provides an overview of the inadequate property rights framework that First Nation communities are subject to under the Indian Act, describes some of the major off-ramps to the Indian Act, and analyses the effectiveness of the First Nations Finance Authority (FNFA). First Nations of Canada have lower quality of life indicators compared to the average Canadian. This is in part due to an inadequate framework of property rights under the Indian Act, which prohibits fee-simple ownership. The inability to leverage reserve land and assets as collateral has resulted in First Nations people being subject to high interest rates due to uncertainty. This pushes them further into the cycle of poverty and substandard living conditions. In the past, governing First Nation reserve lands under the Indian Act has been lengthy, cumbersome, and difficult mainly because the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC) has decision-making power over First Nations. Independence on INAC and the Indian Act can only be achieved through sustainable economic growth from private investment in and independent revenue from capital, research, new technology, human capital, etc. As a result, several off-ramps have been recommended and implemented, which offer more autonomy and control to First Nations people. These mainly include: 1) Property taxation under the Fiscal Management Act allows First Nations to address issues regarding economic development, services, and fiscal integration; seek professional advice; access affordable long-term financing; attract investment on their land; and work towards building partnerships with other governments. 2) Land management under the Land Management Act allows First Nations to opt out of 1/3 of [viii] the Indian Act’s provisions and create their own land codes to legally manage their land, enter contracts, borrow money, and expend and invest money. 3) Self-government under Section 35 of Canada’s Constitution Act allows First Nations to have decision-making authority and jurisdiction ... Report First Nations PRISM - University of Calgary Digital Repository Canada Indian
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description This capstone provides an overview of the inadequate property rights framework that First Nation communities are subject to under the Indian Act, describes some of the major off-ramps to the Indian Act, and analyses the effectiveness of the First Nations Finance Authority (FNFA). First Nations of Canada have lower quality of life indicators compared to the average Canadian. This is in part due to an inadequate framework of property rights under the Indian Act, which prohibits fee-simple ownership. The inability to leverage reserve land and assets as collateral has resulted in First Nations people being subject to high interest rates due to uncertainty. This pushes them further into the cycle of poverty and substandard living conditions. In the past, governing First Nation reserve lands under the Indian Act has been lengthy, cumbersome, and difficult mainly because the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC) has decision-making power over First Nations. Independence on INAC and the Indian Act can only be achieved through sustainable economic growth from private investment in and independent revenue from capital, research, new technology, human capital, etc. As a result, several off-ramps have been recommended and implemented, which offer more autonomy and control to First Nations people. These mainly include: 1) Property taxation under the Fiscal Management Act allows First Nations to address issues regarding economic development, services, and fiscal integration; seek professional advice; access affordable long-term financing; attract investment on their land; and work towards building partnerships with other governments. 2) Land management under the Land Management Act allows First Nations to opt out of 1/3 of [viii] the Indian Act’s provisions and create their own land codes to legally manage their land, enter contracts, borrow money, and expend and invest money. 3) Self-government under Section 35 of Canada’s Constitution Act allows First Nations to have decision-making authority and jurisdiction ...
author2 Flanagan, Thomas
format Report
author Bhaidani, Tanzeel
spellingShingle Bhaidani, Tanzeel
An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act
author_facet Bhaidani, Tanzeel
author_sort Bhaidani, Tanzeel
title An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act
title_short An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act
title_full An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act
title_fullStr An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act
title_full_unstemmed An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act
title_sort analysis of the first nations finance authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate first nations property rights framework under the indian act
publisher School of Public Policy
publishDate 2019
url http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111836
https://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37701
geographic Canada
Indian
geographic_facet Canada
Indian
genre First Nations
genre_facet First Nations
op_relation Bhaidani, T. (2019). An analysis of the First Nations Finance Authority as a viable off-ramp to the inadequate First Nations property rights framework under the Indian Act (Unpublished master's project). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37701
http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111836
op_doi https://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37701
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