Emocije i percepcija - prva fiziološka teorija emocija?

Krajem devetnaestog veka formulisana je prva fiziološka teorija emocija. Prema ovoj teoriji, koju zastupaju Vilijam Džejms (William James) i Karl Georg Lange (Carl Georg Lange), emocija je percepcija telesnih promena. Početkom dvadesetog veka Volter Bredford Kenon (Walter Bradford Cannon) iznosi niz...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Trajkovski, Miroslava
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:unknown
Published: Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd 2012
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Online Access:http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1400
http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/353/1397.pdf
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Summary:Krajem devetnaestog veka formulisana je prva fiziološka teorija emocija. Prema ovoj teoriji, koju zastupaju Vilijam Džejms (William James) i Karl Georg Lange (Carl Georg Lange), emocija je percepcija telesnih promena. Početkom dvadesetog veka Volter Bredford Kenon (Walter Bradford Cannon) iznosi niz kritičkih primedbi usled kojih je ova teorija bila odbačena. U skorije vreme oživelo je interesovanje za Džejms-Langeovu teoriju, prvenstveno zahvaljujući istraživanjima neurologa Antonija Damasija (Antonio Damasio). On brani tezu da je osećaj emocije percepcija telesnih promena. Međutim njegova teza predstavlja modifikaciju Džejms-Langeove teze. U tekstu pokazujem kako se Džejms-Langeova teza mogla braniti nezavisno od novijih neuroloških rezultata, pozivanjem na argumentaciju koju iznose sami Džejms i Lange. Pokazuje se da je za razumevanje emocija ključno razumevanje prirode percepcije. The first physiological theory of emotions was formulated at the end of XIX century. According to this theory, set by William James and C.G. Lange, emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. In late 1920s this theory was abandoned due to W.B. Cannon’s criticism. Recently the interest in James-Lange’s theory has been revived especially due to neurological researches done by Antonio Damasio – he claims that the emotion is the perception of bodily changes. Note that this is not James’ thesis, but its modifications. In the paper I show how James-Lange’s theory could have been defended in the framework of their theories alone, independently of recent neurological results. It follows that for understanding emotions it is essential to understand the nature of perception.