Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze

V pismu iz leta 1663 je Simon de Vries Spinozo prosil, naj nekoliko natančneje obrazloži besedilo, ki ga danes poznamo kot opombo k 10. propoziciji prvega dela Etike. V tej opombi Spinoza zatrdi, da obstoj neskončnega števila atributov, ki se pojmujejo sami po sebi, ne ogrozi monizma, ki ga je v spl...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Škraban, Kajetan
Other Authors: Božovič, Miran
Format: Bachelor Thesis
Language:Slovenian
Published: 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=131801
https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/Dokument.php?id=149210&dn=
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spelling ftuniljubljanair:oai:repozitorij.uni-lj.si:IzpisGradiva.php-id-131801 2023-05-15T18:13:35+02:00 Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze How many substances? »De Vries' problem« in early reception of Spinoza Škraban, Kajetan Božovič, Miran 2021-10-04 application/pdf https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=131801 https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/Dokument.php?id=149210&dn= slv slv https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=131801 https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/Dokument.php?id=149210&dn= info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Spinoza substanca atribut kartezijanstvo substance attribute Cartesianism info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 2021 ftuniljubljanair 2021-12-06T10:26:22Z V pismu iz leta 1663 je Simon de Vries Spinozo prosil, naj nekoliko natančneje obrazloži besedilo, ki ga danes poznamo kot opombo k 10. propoziciji prvega dela Etike. V tej opombi Spinoza zatrdi, da obstoj neskončnega števila atributov, ki se pojmujejo sami po sebi, ne ogrozi monizma, ki ga je v splošnem zagovarjal glede substance. De Vries pa je, narobe, menil, da bi se utegnil atribut v skladu s pojmovanjem iz (današnjih) prvih desetih propozicij Etike osamosvojiti in bi tako mogel zadostiti kriterijem substancialnosti: v Spinozovem sistemu bi tako imeli neskončno število substanc. S tem je de Vries zastavil vprašanje, ki zareže v samo jedro spinozizma. Diplomsko delo najprej pretrese sinhroni in diahroni izvor tega problema, nato se razgleda po njegovi obravnavi v zgodnji recepciji Spinozove filozofije (okvirno do konca 17. stoletja), nazadnje pa skuša tudi ponuditi njegovo razrešitev najprej prek zgodovinske obravnave razvoja pojmov substance in atributa pri Spinozi, nato pa še v njunem imanentnem odnosu v Etiki. In a letter of 1663, Simon de Vries asked Spinoza to explain more precisely the text we know today as the Scholium to Proposition 10 of the first part of the Ethics. In this Scholium Spinoza argues that the existence of an infinite number of attributes that are all conceived in themselves does not compromise the monism he generally advocated regarding the substance. De Vries, however, thought that an attribute could, according to what are today the first ten propositions of the Ethics, emancipate and thus satisfy the criteria of substantiality: in this way, we would have in Spinoza's system an infinite number of substances. De Vries thus raised a question that cuts to the very core of Spinozism. The thesis first examines the synchronic and diachronic origins of this problem, then looks at its treatment in the early reception of Spinoza's philosophy (up to the end of the 17th century), and finally seeks to offer a resolution first through a historical treatment of the development of the concepts of substance and attribute in Spinoza, and then in their immanent relation in the Ethics. Bachelor Thesis sami Repository of the University of Ljubljana (RUL)
institution Open Polar
collection Repository of the University of Ljubljana (RUL)
op_collection_id ftuniljubljanair
language Slovenian
topic Spinoza
substanca
atribut
kartezijanstvo
substance
attribute
Cartesianism
spellingShingle Spinoza
substanca
atribut
kartezijanstvo
substance
attribute
Cartesianism
Škraban, Kajetan
Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze
topic_facet Spinoza
substanca
atribut
kartezijanstvo
substance
attribute
Cartesianism
description V pismu iz leta 1663 je Simon de Vries Spinozo prosil, naj nekoliko natančneje obrazloži besedilo, ki ga danes poznamo kot opombo k 10. propoziciji prvega dela Etike. V tej opombi Spinoza zatrdi, da obstoj neskončnega števila atributov, ki se pojmujejo sami po sebi, ne ogrozi monizma, ki ga je v splošnem zagovarjal glede substance. De Vries pa je, narobe, menil, da bi se utegnil atribut v skladu s pojmovanjem iz (današnjih) prvih desetih propozicij Etike osamosvojiti in bi tako mogel zadostiti kriterijem substancialnosti: v Spinozovem sistemu bi tako imeli neskončno število substanc. S tem je de Vries zastavil vprašanje, ki zareže v samo jedro spinozizma. Diplomsko delo najprej pretrese sinhroni in diahroni izvor tega problema, nato se razgleda po njegovi obravnavi v zgodnji recepciji Spinozove filozofije (okvirno do konca 17. stoletja), nazadnje pa skuša tudi ponuditi njegovo razrešitev najprej prek zgodovinske obravnave razvoja pojmov substance in atributa pri Spinozi, nato pa še v njunem imanentnem odnosu v Etiki. In a letter of 1663, Simon de Vries asked Spinoza to explain more precisely the text we know today as the Scholium to Proposition 10 of the first part of the Ethics. In this Scholium Spinoza argues that the existence of an infinite number of attributes that are all conceived in themselves does not compromise the monism he generally advocated regarding the substance. De Vries, however, thought that an attribute could, according to what are today the first ten propositions of the Ethics, emancipate and thus satisfy the criteria of substantiality: in this way, we would have in Spinoza's system an infinite number of substances. De Vries thus raised a question that cuts to the very core of Spinozism. The thesis first examines the synchronic and diachronic origins of this problem, then looks at its treatment in the early reception of Spinoza's philosophy (up to the end of the 17th century), and finally seeks to offer a resolution first through a historical treatment of the development of the concepts of substance and attribute in Spinoza, and then in their immanent relation in the Ethics.
author2 Božovič, Miran
format Bachelor Thesis
author Škraban, Kajetan
author_facet Škraban, Kajetan
author_sort Škraban, Kajetan
title Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze
title_short Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze
title_full Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze
title_fullStr Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze
title_full_unstemmed Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze
title_sort koliko substanc? »de vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji spinoze
publishDate 2021
url https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=131801
https://repozitorij.uni-lj.si/Dokument.php?id=149210&dn=
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genre_facet sami
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