The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation

In the contemporary mainstream configuration of most legal orders, a given norm or standard of behaviour is said to be binding upon legal relations between subjects if that norm or standard can be validated by virtue of the doctrine of sources of that legal order. In most legal orders, including int...

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Published in:European Journal of International Law
Main Author: D'Aspremont, Jean
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Published: 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:https://research.manchester.ac.uk/en/publications/9d041522-ca4d-4a54-8a7d-727bafbb3e99
https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw055
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spelling ftumanchesterpub:oai:pure.atira.dk:publications/9d041522-ca4d-4a54-8a7d-727bafbb3e99 2023-11-12T04:08:29+01:00 The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation D'Aspremont, Jean 2017-01-29 https://research.manchester.ac.uk/en/publications/9d041522-ca4d-4a54-8a7d-727bafbb3e99 https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw055 eng eng info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess D'Aspremont , J 2017 , ' The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation ' , European Journal of International Law , vol. 27 , no. 4 , pp. 1027-1041 . https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw055 article 2017 ftumanchesterpub https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw055 2023-10-30T09:17:19Z In the contemporary mainstream configuration of most legal orders, a given norm or standard of behaviour is said to be binding upon legal relations between subjects if that norm or standard can be validated by virtue of the doctrine of sources of that legal order. In most legal orders, including international law, the doctrine of sources even enjoys a monopoly on the tracing of bindingness, bearing only remotely or indirectly upon the interpretation of the content of those standards and norms that sources recognize as valid. The idea that the doctrine of sources enjoys a monopoly on the tracing of bindingness and does not constrain interpretation has been seriously eroded by the International Court of Justice in its 31 March 2014 judgment concerning Whaling in the Antarctic. As will be explained in this article, the Court comes very close to calibrate the interpretive effects of the resolutions of the International Whaling Commission through the doctrine of sources. As will be shown, this blurring between sources and interpretation warrants the attention given the efforts that the Court had, over the years, invested in consolidating two distinct doctrines – that is, the doctrine of sources and the doctrine of interpretation. After briefly recalling how the relation between interpretation and sources was approached by the Court, a critical look is taken at the implications of the judgment from the vantage point of the distinction between bindingness and interpretive effects. This brief article ends with a few remarks on the oscillations between sources and interpretation witnessed in contemporary international legal discourses. Article in Journal/Newspaper Antarc* Antarctic The University of Manchester: Research Explorer Antarctic The Antarctic European Journal of International Law 27 4 1027 1041
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description In the contemporary mainstream configuration of most legal orders, a given norm or standard of behaviour is said to be binding upon legal relations between subjects if that norm or standard can be validated by virtue of the doctrine of sources of that legal order. In most legal orders, including international law, the doctrine of sources even enjoys a monopoly on the tracing of bindingness, bearing only remotely or indirectly upon the interpretation of the content of those standards and norms that sources recognize as valid. The idea that the doctrine of sources enjoys a monopoly on the tracing of bindingness and does not constrain interpretation has been seriously eroded by the International Court of Justice in its 31 March 2014 judgment concerning Whaling in the Antarctic. As will be explained in this article, the Court comes very close to calibrate the interpretive effects of the resolutions of the International Whaling Commission through the doctrine of sources. As will be shown, this blurring between sources and interpretation warrants the attention given the efforts that the Court had, over the years, invested in consolidating two distinct doctrines – that is, the doctrine of sources and the doctrine of interpretation. After briefly recalling how the relation between interpretation and sources was approached by the Court, a critical look is taken at the implications of the judgment from the vantage point of the distinction between bindingness and interpretive effects. This brief article ends with a few remarks on the oscillations between sources and interpretation witnessed in contemporary international legal discourses.
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author D'Aspremont, Jean
spellingShingle D'Aspremont, Jean
The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation
author_facet D'Aspremont, Jean
author_sort D'Aspremont, Jean
title The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation
title_short The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation
title_full The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation
title_fullStr The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation
title_full_unstemmed The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation
title_sort international court of justice, the whales and the blurring of the lines between sources and interpretation
publishDate 2017
url https://research.manchester.ac.uk/en/publications/9d041522-ca4d-4a54-8a7d-727bafbb3e99
https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw055
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op_source D'Aspremont , J 2017 , ' The International Court of Justice, the Whales and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation ' , European Journal of International Law , vol. 27 , no. 4 , pp. 1027-1041 . https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw055
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