| Summary: | This paper takes on to examine the negotiations regarding fishing rights in a disputed area in Barents Sea called the Loophole. The negotiations of the Loophole are interesting since they are conducted between states that differ a lot in size on account of aggregate resources. The aim is to apply ideas about power asymmetry in negotiations and small state behavior on the Loophole case. Different views on power and how to use the small state concept are discussed, in order to grasp the essentials behind the two theories. The asymmetry theory uses the idea of perceived power as main idea and the small state theory state that the prioritizing of the small states enables them to function well in negotiations despite small administrations. The negotiations were conducted between the three states Iceland, Norway and Russia in a manner that resembles a bilateral negotiation. By looking at the background, the actions taken and the result and then compare it with the predictions given. The conclusion is that the theories could be well applied to the Loophole case, if looked upon in its special context. Number of characters: 75 270
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