Homo Æqualis : A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games.

• Main Authors: Barr, A, Wallace, C, Ensminger, J, Henrich, J, Barrett, C, Bolyanatz, A, Cardenas, J, Gurven, M, Gwako, E, Lesorogol, C, Marlowe, F, McElreath, R, Tracer, D, Ziker, J
• Format: Report
• Language: English
• Published: CSAE (University of Oxford) 2016
• Subjects: Arctic
• Online Access: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b4fdda7d-d836-4b38-b24c-f5686947a4cf

Data from three bargaining games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game—played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling.