Homo aequalis: a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games

• Main Authors: Barr, A, Wallace, C, Ensminger, J, Henrich, J
• Format: Report
• Language: unknown
• Published: University of Oxford 2020
• Subjects: Arctic
• Online Access: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:387f065e-ab58-47ad-8583-9bcdf0e3fb18

Data from three bargaining games - the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game - played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergencies between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling