On International Fisheries Agreements, Entry Deterrence, and Ecological Uncertainty

• Published in: Journal of Environmental Management
• Main Authors: Ellefsen, Hans, Grønbæk, Lone, Ravn-Jonsen, Lars
• Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
• Language: English
• Published: 2017
• Subjects: Bio-economic modeling; Cooperative game; Ecological uncertainty; Entry deterrence; Nash game; Stability of sharing rule; Uncertainty; Animals; Fishes; Ecology; Fisheries/economics; Population Dynamics; North East Atlantic
• Online Access: https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/a46d438e-d28a-4a6b-b099-480134005b01; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2017.01.044

A prerequisite for an international fisheries agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect the benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is true. The agreement, therefore, implicitly...