Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse
Professors R. Wade and H.-J. Chang explain the 2008 collapse of the Icelandic banks as a consequence of deregulation and even a “neo-liberal experiment”. Wade uses the notion of a “shadow elite” to characterise power relationships before the collapse. Here, these explanations will be explored. Was f...
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ftskemman:oai:skemman.is:1946/16789 2023-05-15T16:43:08+02:00 Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson 1953- Háskóli Íslands 2013-10 application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/1946/16789 en eng Þjóðarspegillinn XIV: Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum - Stjórnmálafræðideild 978 9935 424 17 4 http://hdl.handle.net/1946/16789 Þjóðarspegillinn XIV Article 2013 ftskemman 2022-12-11T06:57:32Z Professors R. Wade and H.-J. Chang explain the 2008 collapse of the Icelandic banks as a consequence of deregulation and even a “neo-liberal experiment”. Wade uses the notion of a “shadow elite” to characterise power relationships before the collapse. Here, these explanations will be explored. Was financial regulation laxer in Iceland than in other EEA countries? Was a “neo-liberal experiment” conducted in 1991–2004? What does such a claim mean? Thirdly, was a “shadow elite” very powerful in the years before the bank collapse? How can such a “shadow elite”, and its power, be identified? The conclusion is that these explanations are mostly unfounded. Financial regulation was the same in Iceland as in other EEA countries; there was no “neo-liberal” experiment in Iceland 1991–2004; during that period Iceland was not ruled by any one “shadow elite”, although some such elites existed. However, Wade and Chang may be right on two counts: In Iceland, bankers and businessmen were viewed with a certain laxness, especially in the years 2004–2008; and even if there is usually a competition between different “shadow elites” in a Western democracy, one such elite became quite powerful in Iceland 2004–2008. Article in Journal/Newspaper Iceland Skemman (Iceland) |
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Skemman (Iceland) |
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English |
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Þjóðarspegillinn XIV |
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Þjóðarspegillinn XIV Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson 1953- Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse |
topic_facet |
Þjóðarspegillinn XIV |
description |
Professors R. Wade and H.-J. Chang explain the 2008 collapse of the Icelandic banks as a consequence of deregulation and even a “neo-liberal experiment”. Wade uses the notion of a “shadow elite” to characterise power relationships before the collapse. Here, these explanations will be explored. Was financial regulation laxer in Iceland than in other EEA countries? Was a “neo-liberal experiment” conducted in 1991–2004? What does such a claim mean? Thirdly, was a “shadow elite” very powerful in the years before the bank collapse? How can such a “shadow elite”, and its power, be identified? The conclusion is that these explanations are mostly unfounded. Financial regulation was the same in Iceland as in other EEA countries; there was no “neo-liberal” experiment in Iceland 1991–2004; during that period Iceland was not ruled by any one “shadow elite”, although some such elites existed. However, Wade and Chang may be right on two counts: In Iceland, bankers and businessmen were viewed with a certain laxness, especially in the years 2004–2008; and even if there is usually a competition between different “shadow elites” in a Western democracy, one such elite became quite powerful in Iceland 2004–2008. |
author2 |
Háskóli Íslands |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson 1953- |
author_facet |
Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson 1953- |
author_sort |
Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson 1953- |
title |
Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse |
title_short |
Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse |
title_full |
Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse |
title_fullStr |
Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse |
title_full_unstemmed |
Explanations of the Icelandic Bank Collapse |
title_sort |
explanations of the icelandic bank collapse |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1946/16789 |
genre |
Iceland |
genre_facet |
Iceland |
op_relation |
Þjóðarspegillinn XIV: Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum - Stjórnmálafræðideild 978 9935 424 17 4 http://hdl.handle.net/1946/16789 |
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1766033461400829952 |