The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action

The neo-liberal economic mode of ocean fisheries governance, which emphasizes private property rights, is becoming a dominant proposal for preventing the problem of over-fishing. However, much of the economic literature on fisheries property rights places little emphasis on transaction costs: the co...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Loucks, Laura Ann
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Published: 2005
Subjects:
Online Access:http://summit.sfu.ca/item/5174
id ftsimonfu:oai:summit.sfu.ca:5174
record_format openpolar
spelling ftsimonfu:oai:summit.sfu.ca:5174 2023-05-15T18:20:06+02:00 The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action Loucks, Laura Ann 2005 http://summit.sfu.ca/item/5174 English eng http://summit.sfu.ca/item/5174 Thesis 2005 ftsimonfu 2022-04-07T18:34:09Z The neo-liberal economic mode of ocean fisheries governance, which emphasizes private property rights, is becoming a dominant proposal for preventing the problem of over-fishing. However, much of the economic literature on fisheries property rights places little emphasis on transaction costs: the costs of securing, monitoring and enforcing property rights. Conversely, the new institutional economic literature argues that private property rights may be very costly for common pool resource management regimes such as fisheries, while collective property rights, under certain conditions, present a viable way in which people co-operate to reduce transaction costs. The purpose of this thesis research is to understand the transaction cost problems that perpetuate over-fishing and to explore the conditions under which these problems can be resolved through fisheries co-management institutions. In so doing, I analyse the evolution of collective property rights and transaction costs in the Gulf of St. Lawrence snow crab fishery which ultimately led to a negotiated Area 19 snow crab comanagement agreement in 1996. More specifically, I examine the dynamic relationship between fishermen and policy makers over time, to illustrate both the barriers and opportunities for successful management of a common pool resource. This research shows how the joint claimancy of common pool resource users facilitates reciprocal transaction cost problems with negative cascading effects over time. Thus, bargaining situations frequently arise between fishermen and government agencies as joint claimants attempt to reduce the reciprocal transaction cost effects by securing credible governmental commitment through collective action. However, the possibility for long enduring co-management institutions to resolve these transaction cost problems depends largely on the level of social capital and natural capital available in the specific fishery, such that credible commitment may be sustained. In case of the Area 19 snow crab fishery, the level of social conflict over license access criteria perpetuated a reciprocal transaction cost problem, resulting in a unique bargaining situation in a specific social, economic and ecological context. Thus, this thesis demonstrates how the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action created a bargaining situation from which a comanagement agreement could be successfully negotiated. Thesis Snow crab Summit - SFU Research Repository (Simon Fraser University)
institution Open Polar
collection Summit - SFU Research Repository (Simon Fraser University)
op_collection_id ftsimonfu
language English
description The neo-liberal economic mode of ocean fisheries governance, which emphasizes private property rights, is becoming a dominant proposal for preventing the problem of over-fishing. However, much of the economic literature on fisheries property rights places little emphasis on transaction costs: the costs of securing, monitoring and enforcing property rights. Conversely, the new institutional economic literature argues that private property rights may be very costly for common pool resource management regimes such as fisheries, while collective property rights, under certain conditions, present a viable way in which people co-operate to reduce transaction costs. The purpose of this thesis research is to understand the transaction cost problems that perpetuate over-fishing and to explore the conditions under which these problems can be resolved through fisheries co-management institutions. In so doing, I analyse the evolution of collective property rights and transaction costs in the Gulf of St. Lawrence snow crab fishery which ultimately led to a negotiated Area 19 snow crab comanagement agreement in 1996. More specifically, I examine the dynamic relationship between fishermen and policy makers over time, to illustrate both the barriers and opportunities for successful management of a common pool resource. This research shows how the joint claimancy of common pool resource users facilitates reciprocal transaction cost problems with negative cascading effects over time. Thus, bargaining situations frequently arise between fishermen and government agencies as joint claimants attempt to reduce the reciprocal transaction cost effects by securing credible governmental commitment through collective action. However, the possibility for long enduring co-management institutions to resolve these transaction cost problems depends largely on the level of social capital and natural capital available in the specific fishery, such that credible commitment may be sustained. In case of the Area 19 snow crab fishery, the level of social conflict over license access criteria perpetuated a reciprocal transaction cost problem, resulting in a unique bargaining situation in a specific social, economic and ecological context. Thus, this thesis demonstrates how the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action created a bargaining situation from which a comanagement agreement could be successfully negotiated.
format Thesis
author Loucks, Laura Ann
spellingShingle Loucks, Laura Ann
The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action
author_facet Loucks, Laura Ann
author_sort Loucks, Laura Ann
title The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action
title_short The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action
title_full The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action
title_fullStr The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action
title_full_unstemmed The evolution of the Area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: Understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action
title_sort evolution of the area 19 snow crab co-management agreement: understanding the inter-relationship between transaction costs, credible commitment and collective action
publishDate 2005
url http://summit.sfu.ca/item/5174
genre Snow crab
genre_facet Snow crab
op_relation http://summit.sfu.ca/item/5174
_version_ 1766197578273128448