Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation
Fishermen around the world are usually remunerated by shares. Iceland is no exception in that respect. The fixed wage systems,that have been tried out, have been short- lived and their utilization limited. The fundamental question asked in this paper is: Why do almost all vessel owners use the same...
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ftrepec:oai:RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:9702002 2023-05-15T16:49:30+02:00 Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation Thorolfur Matthiasson https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/9702/9702002.pdf unknown https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/9702/9702002.pdf preprint ftrepec 2020-12-04T13:32:29Z Fishermen around the world are usually remunerated by shares. Iceland is no exception in that respect. The fixed wage systems,that have been tried out, have been short- lived and their utilization limited. The fundamental question asked in this paper is: Why do almost all vessel owners use the same remuneration principles? The answer offered is that the circumstances under which fishing is conducted play a vital role here. Surveillance of the conduct of employees is almost impossible. Hence, vessel owners must develop some system for motivating workers and to discourage shirking. It is shown that sharing is better than alternative forms of remuneration in that respect. The production unit is a small platform that is not easily abandoned during a trip. The product ofr a given trip is well- defined. All of these factors help to explain the prevalence of sharing in fisheries. Remuneration system in fisheries, Contingent Renewal, Skipper Contracts Report Iceland RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) |
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Fishermen around the world are usually remunerated by shares. Iceland is no exception in that respect. The fixed wage systems,that have been tried out, have been short- lived and their utilization limited. The fundamental question asked in this paper is: Why do almost all vessel owners use the same remuneration principles? The answer offered is that the circumstances under which fishing is conducted play a vital role here. Surveillance of the conduct of employees is almost impossible. Hence, vessel owners must develop some system for motivating workers and to discourage shirking. It is shown that sharing is better than alternative forms of remuneration in that respect. The production unit is a small platform that is not easily abandoned during a trip. The product ofr a given trip is well- defined. All of these factors help to explain the prevalence of sharing in fisheries. Remuneration system in fisheries, Contingent Renewal, Skipper Contracts |
format |
Report |
author |
Thorolfur Matthiasson |
spellingShingle |
Thorolfur Matthiasson Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation |
author_facet |
Thorolfur Matthiasson |
author_sort |
Thorolfur Matthiasson |
title |
Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation |
title_short |
Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation |
title_full |
Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation |
title_fullStr |
Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation |
title_sort |
fixed wage or share: contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation |
url |
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/9702/9702002.pdf |
genre |
Iceland |
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Iceland |
op_relation |
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/9702/9702002.pdf |
_version_ |
1766039632959504384 |