Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards
This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding tha...
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ftrepec:oai:RePEc:uwp:landec:v:85:y:2009:i:4:p:637-654 2023-05-15T18:08:15+02:00 Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards Anne Borge Johannesen Anders Skonhoft http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/85/4/637 unknown http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/85/4/637 article ftrepec 2020-12-04T13:34:14Z This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ outcome. Article in Journal/Newspaper saami RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) |
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RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) |
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This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ outcome. |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Anne Borge Johannesen Anders Skonhoft |
spellingShingle |
Anne Borge Johannesen Anders Skonhoft Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards |
author_facet |
Anne Borge Johannesen Anders Skonhoft |
author_sort |
Anne Borge Johannesen |
title |
Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards |
title_short |
Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards |
title_full |
Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards |
title_fullStr |
Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards |
title_full_unstemmed |
Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards |
title_sort |
local common property exploitation with rewards |
url |
http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/85/4/637 |
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saami |
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saami |
op_relation |
http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/85/4/637 |
_version_ |
1766180513713750016 |