Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs

Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ida, Ferrara, Paul, Missios
Format: Report
Language:unknown
Subjects:
Turbot
Online Access:https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70749/1/MPRA_paper_70749.pdf
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spelling ftrepec:oai:RePEc:pra:mprapa:70749 2023-05-15T18:41:11+02:00 Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs Ida, Ferrara Paul, Missios https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70749/1/MPRA_paper_70749.pdf unknown https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70749/1/MPRA_paper_70749.pdf preprint ftrepec 2020-12-04T13:32:07Z Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with and provide insights into the particulars of the recent disputes. Conservation, economic theory, natural resource management, game theory, optimal control theory, fisheries management, renewable. Report Turbot RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
institution Open Polar
collection RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
op_collection_id ftrepec
language unknown
description Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with and provide insights into the particulars of the recent disputes. Conservation, economic theory, natural resource management, game theory, optimal control theory, fisheries management, renewable.
format Report
author Ida, Ferrara
Paul, Missios
spellingShingle Ida, Ferrara
Paul, Missios
Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
author_facet Ida, Ferrara
Paul, Missios
author_sort Ida, Ferrara
title Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
title_short Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
title_full Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
title_fullStr Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
title_full_unstemmed Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
title_sort transboundary renewable resource management: a dynamic game with differing non-cooperative payoffs
url https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70749/1/MPRA_paper_70749.pdf
genre Turbot
genre_facet Turbot
op_relation https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70749/1/MPRA_paper_70749.pdf
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