Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir

This paper briefly summarizes recent research on justice, in particular Konow’s (2003) positive theory of justice. This research is then applied to recent events in Iceland: the attempt by Iceland’s largest bank to take over a savings bank. Shortly after the deal was announced the Icelandic Parliame...

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Main Author: Baldursson, Fridrik M.
Format: Report
Language:unknown
Subjects:
Online Access:https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14746/1/MPRA_paper_14746.pdf
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14749/1/MPRA_paper_14749.pdf
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spelling ftrepec:oai:RePEc:pra:mprapa:14746 2023-05-15T16:49:51+02:00 Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir Justice and pressure groups Baldursson, Fridrik M. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14746/1/MPRA_paper_14746.pdf https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14749/1/MPRA_paper_14749.pdf unknown https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14746/1/MPRA_paper_14746.pdf https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14749/1/MPRA_paper_14749.pdf preprint ftrepec 2020-12-04T13:35:57Z This paper briefly summarizes recent research on justice, in particular Konow’s (2003) positive theory of justice. This research is then applied to recent events in Iceland: the attempt by Iceland’s largest bank to take over a savings bank. Shortly after the deal was announced the Icelandic Parliament quickly and unanimously passed a law which blocked it by creating a hold-up situation for the savings bank board: if it converts the bank to a corporation – as is necessary prior to takeover – an outside board will replace the present board. It is argued that the strong support for the law is puzzling when seen from the perspective of theories of pressure groups, regulatory threat and privatization. However, the paper claims that this may be explained by positive analysis of justice: the board played an ultimatum game against the general public and made what was perceived as an unfair proposal. The proposal was soundly rejected by the public, as usually happens when unfair offers are made in ultimatum games. Positive Justice, Equity, Pressure groups, Regulatory threat, Ultimatum games Report Iceland RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
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description This paper briefly summarizes recent research on justice, in particular Konow’s (2003) positive theory of justice. This research is then applied to recent events in Iceland: the attempt by Iceland’s largest bank to take over a savings bank. Shortly after the deal was announced the Icelandic Parliament quickly and unanimously passed a law which blocked it by creating a hold-up situation for the savings bank board: if it converts the bank to a corporation – as is necessary prior to takeover – an outside board will replace the present board. It is argued that the strong support for the law is puzzling when seen from the perspective of theories of pressure groups, regulatory threat and privatization. However, the paper claims that this may be explained by positive analysis of justice: the board played an ultimatum game against the general public and made what was perceived as an unfair proposal. The proposal was soundly rejected by the public, as usually happens when unfair offers are made in ultimatum games. Positive Justice, Equity, Pressure groups, Regulatory threat, Ultimatum games
format Report
author Baldursson, Fridrik M.
spellingShingle Baldursson, Fridrik M.
Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
author_facet Baldursson, Fridrik M.
author_sort Baldursson, Fridrik M.
title Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
title_short Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
title_full Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
title_fullStr Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
title_full_unstemmed Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
title_sort réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
url https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14746/1/MPRA_paper_14746.pdf
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14749/1/MPRA_paper_14749.pdf
genre Iceland
genre_facet Iceland
op_relation https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14746/1/MPRA_paper_14746.pdf
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14749/1/MPRA_paper_14749.pdf
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