Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has totally transfigured the world’s financial landscape. The lessons we have derived have also transformed our perception of banking risks, contagion and its implication for banking regulation. It is now well established that risks were mispriced, accumulated in neuralgic points...

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Main Author: Xavier Freixas
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:unknown
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00241.x
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spelling ftrepec:oai:RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:25:y:2010:i:62:p:375-399. 2024-04-14T08:13:57+00:00 Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation Dividends and bank capital in the financial crisis of 2007–2009 Bank dividends in the crisis: A failure of governance Covar The economics of bankruptcy reform Interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention Things my mortgage broker never told me about homeownership: Escrow, property taxes, and mortgage delinquency Entidades de Crédito. Normas de Información Financiera Pública y Reservada y Modelos de Estados Financieros International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards A new approach to corporate reorganizations Financial innovation, regulation, and reform The first casualty of the crisis: Iceland Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Regulation: Key Issues for the G20 Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity ‘Crisis management in Europe’ Bank liquidity, interbank markets, and monetary policy Burden sharing in a banking crisis in Europe Rethinking capital regulation The economics of bank restructuring: Understanding the options On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates The Cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment Liquidity insurance for systemic crises Mitigating the procyclicality of Basel II The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global economic crisis Xavier Freixas http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00241.x unknown http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00241.x article ftrepec 2024-03-19T10:38:24Z The current crisis has totally transfigured the world’s financial landscape. The lessons we have derived have also transformed our perception of banking risks, contagion and its implication for banking regulation. It is now well established that risks were mispriced, accumulated in neuralgic points of the financial system, were amplified by procyclical regulation and the instability and fragility of financial institutions. Yet the implications on the design of post-crisis banking regulation are unclear. In this article we summarize the key issues the new regulatory framework have to consider and how they relate to one another. As the debate over the new financial regulation architecture has evolved, two different views seem to emerge: one views banking crises as an unavoidable phenomenon, so that regulation should provide a framework to cope with its impact. The other considers that crisis could be avoided provided banking regulation is duly modified. We argue that for consistency reasons choosing one view or the other leads to a completely different perspective on the future of banking regulation, as it implies a different view on the banking industry, bank stakeholders’ rights, banks’ corporate governance and contagion. As a consequence, choosing the incorrect view of banking crises may lead to an inefficient banking industry.— Xavier Freixas Article in Journal/Newspaper Iceland RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
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collection RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
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description The current crisis has totally transfigured the world’s financial landscape. The lessons we have derived have also transformed our perception of banking risks, contagion and its implication for banking regulation. It is now well established that risks were mispriced, accumulated in neuralgic points of the financial system, were amplified by procyclical regulation and the instability and fragility of financial institutions. Yet the implications on the design of post-crisis banking regulation are unclear. In this article we summarize the key issues the new regulatory framework have to consider and how they relate to one another. As the debate over the new financial regulation architecture has evolved, two different views seem to emerge: one views banking crises as an unavoidable phenomenon, so that regulation should provide a framework to cope with its impact. The other considers that crisis could be avoided provided banking regulation is duly modified. We argue that for consistency reasons choosing one view or the other leads to a completely different perspective on the future of banking regulation, as it implies a different view on the banking industry, bank stakeholders’ rights, banks’ corporate governance and contagion. As a consequence, choosing the incorrect view of banking crises may lead to an inefficient banking industry.— Xavier Freixas
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author Xavier Freixas
spellingShingle Xavier Freixas
Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation
author_facet Xavier Freixas
author_sort Xavier Freixas
title Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation
title_short Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation
title_full Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation
title_fullStr Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation
title_full_unstemmed Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation
title_sort post-crisis challenges to bank regulation
url http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00241.x
genre Iceland
genre_facet Iceland
op_relation http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00241.x
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