Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland

Iceland has managed its large fishing industry in a sustainable and profitable way. The foundations of this success are setting Total Allowable Catches (TACs) based on scientific recommendations of what is biologically sustainable and the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system, which gives each...

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Main Authors: Gunnar Haraldsson, David Carey
Format: Report
Language:unknown
Subjects:
Tac
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg566jfrpzr-en
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spelling ftrepec:oai:RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:891-en 2024-04-14T08:13:30+00:00 Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland Gunnar Haraldsson David Carey https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg566jfrpzr-en unknown https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg566jfrpzr-en preprint ftrepec https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg566jfrpzr-en 2024-03-19T10:37:18Z Iceland has managed its large fishing industry in a sustainable and profitable way. The foundations of this success are setting Total Allowable Catches (TACs) based on scientific recommendations of what is biologically sustainable and the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system, which gives each holder the right to catch a certain of the TAC in various species. The efficiency of this system could be under threat from potential policy responses to the perceived unfairness of quotas having initially been given away and by Iceland’s possible accession to the EU. However, there is nothing the government can do now to do undo the unfairness of the initial allocation. Nevertheless, it could be attractive to increase the special fisheries resource rent tax as it is likely to be a more efficient tax than most others, although the increase should not be so great as to damage the fisheries management system. The resource rent could also be increased by reducing TACs from the current, biologically sustainable level to the level that maximizes rent. Provided that Iceland is able to negotiate to maintain the authority to set TACs and to keep the ITQ system, joining the EU, and hence the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), should not reduce the efficiency of the Icelandic fisheries management system. This Working Paper related to the 2011 OECD Economic Survey of Iceland. (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Iceland) Pour une pêche durable et efficiente en Islande L’Islande a géré son vaste secteur de la pêche de façon durable et rentable. Ce succès repose sur l’instauration de totaux admissibles de captures (TAC) fondés sur des recommandations scientifiques concernant la durabilité biologique, et sur le système des quotas individuels transférables (QIT) qui confère à chaque détenteur d’un quota le droit de pêcher une part du TAC défini pour chacune des espèces. L’efficience de ce système pourrait être menacée par des mesures publiques possibles en réponse au sentiment d’injustice lié à l’attribution initiale des quotas, et par l’adhésion ... Report Iceland Islande RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) Tac ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500)
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description Iceland has managed its large fishing industry in a sustainable and profitable way. The foundations of this success are setting Total Allowable Catches (TACs) based on scientific recommendations of what is biologically sustainable and the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system, which gives each holder the right to catch a certain of the TAC in various species. The efficiency of this system could be under threat from potential policy responses to the perceived unfairness of quotas having initially been given away and by Iceland’s possible accession to the EU. However, there is nothing the government can do now to do undo the unfairness of the initial allocation. Nevertheless, it could be attractive to increase the special fisheries resource rent tax as it is likely to be a more efficient tax than most others, although the increase should not be so great as to damage the fisheries management system. The resource rent could also be increased by reducing TACs from the current, biologically sustainable level to the level that maximizes rent. Provided that Iceland is able to negotiate to maintain the authority to set TACs and to keep the ITQ system, joining the EU, and hence the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), should not reduce the efficiency of the Icelandic fisheries management system. This Working Paper related to the 2011 OECD Economic Survey of Iceland. (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Iceland) Pour une pêche durable et efficiente en Islande L’Islande a géré son vaste secteur de la pêche de façon durable et rentable. Ce succès repose sur l’instauration de totaux admissibles de captures (TAC) fondés sur des recommandations scientifiques concernant la durabilité biologique, et sur le système des quotas individuels transférables (QIT) qui confère à chaque détenteur d’un quota le droit de pêcher une part du TAC défini pour chacune des espèces. L’efficience de ce système pourrait être menacée par des mesures publiques possibles en réponse au sentiment d’injustice lié à l’attribution initiale des quotas, et par l’adhésion ...
format Report
author Gunnar Haraldsson
David Carey
spellingShingle Gunnar Haraldsson
David Carey
Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland
author_facet Gunnar Haraldsson
David Carey
author_sort Gunnar Haraldsson
title Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland
title_short Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland
title_full Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland
title_fullStr Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland
title_full_unstemmed Ensuring a Sustainable and Efficient Fishery in Iceland
title_sort ensuring a sustainable and efficient fishery in iceland
url https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg566jfrpzr-en
long_lat ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500)
geographic Tac
geographic_facet Tac
genre Iceland
Islande
genre_facet Iceland
Islande
op_relation https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg566jfrpzr-en
op_doi https://doi.org/10.1787/5kg566jfrpzr-en
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