| Summary: | The coexistence of the national patent, of the European patent and of the newer creation – the Community patent – does not impair, in any way, the optimum operation of the single market in general and of the free movement of goods in particular. Due to the different regulations in the national laws regarding intellectual property rights, originally, there was a risk that the national goods markets in the European Union might stay completely separate, operating differently. The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the decisions Consten-Grundig - 58/64 of July 13, 1966, Parke Davis - 24/67 of February 29, 1968, Centrofarm vs Sterling Drug - 15/74 of October 18, 1974, Terrapin vs. Terranova -119/75 of June 22, 1976, Hoffmann-Laroche - 102/77 of May 23, 1978) had an important role in standardizing them, by making a clear distinction between the intellectual property rights and their exercise. But the number of legal systems in effect regarding the regulation of the patent is still equal to the number of Member-States in the European Union. A comparison between the present European patent and the patents in the USA or Japan, from the point of view of costs, makes clear the excessive costs of obtaining a European patent (as high as eight times the cost in Japan, for example). The solution identified by the European legislator was to establish the Community patent. The preservation of the role of the European Patent Office (the same institution involved in the European patenting process) is combined with the accessibility of patenting costs for the patent applicants (especially for small and medium enterprises for whom they are intended), with the establishment of a single, unitary set of procedural rules and with a unitary and compulsory legal interpretation in the entire European Union, meant to lower the cost of the Community patent to half the cost of the European patent. patent; Community patent; European patent; right; case-law
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