Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, cl...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Turner, Matthew, Weninger, Quinn
Format: Report
Language:unknown
Subjects:
Ocean quahog
Online Access:http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/paper_11422_04006.pdf
id ftrepec:oai:RePEc:isu:genres:11464
record_format openpolar
spelling ftrepec:oai:RePEc:isu:genres:11464 2024-04-14T08:17:52+00:00 Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis Turner, Matthew Weninger, Quinn http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/paper_11422_04006.pdf unknown http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/paper_11422_04006.pdf preprint ftrepec 2024-03-19T10:30:28Z Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results; (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, 'meetings with costly participation', (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in US fisheries. Report Ocean quahog RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
institution Open Polar
collection RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
op_collection_id ftrepec
language unknown
description Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results; (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, 'meetings with costly participation', (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in US fisheries.
format Report
author Turner, Matthew
Weninger, Quinn
spellingShingle Turner, Matthew
Weninger, Quinn
Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
author_facet Turner, Matthew
Weninger, Quinn
author_sort Turner, Matthew
title Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
title_short Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
title_full Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
title_fullStr Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
title_full_unstemmed Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
title_sort meetings with costly participation: an empirical analysis
url http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/paper_11422_04006.pdf
genre Ocean quahog
genre_facet Ocean quahog
op_relation http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/paper_11422_04006.pdf
_version_ 1796317182305501184

Similar Items