Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'

The efficiency and equity consequences of different rules for the allocation of rights to utilize a common renewable resource such as the demersal fish stocks in the waters around Iceland is discussed. It is asked whether regulatory processes under consideration in Iceland can be reversed and at wha...

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Main Author: Matthíasson, Thorolfur
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:unknown
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308-597X(92)90082-Z
id ftrepec:oai:RePEc:eee:marpol:v:16:y:1992:i:3:p:210-231
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spelling ftrepec:oai:RePEc:eee:marpol:v:16:y:1992:i:3:p:210-231 2024-04-14T08:13:27+00:00 Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons' Matthíasson, Thorolfur http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308-597X(92)90082-Z unknown http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308-597X(92)90082-Z article ftrepec 2024-03-19T10:32:15Z The efficiency and equity consequences of different rules for the allocation of rights to utilize a common renewable resource such as the demersal fish stocks in the waters around Iceland is discussed. It is asked whether regulatory processes under consideration in Iceland can be reversed and at what cost. It is also asked which distributional mechanisms are generated when interest groups have managed to acquire or are bestowed with the authority to distribute rights to utilize a former common resource. An attempt is made to find out what characterizes a 'good' contract in terms of efficiency and equity. It is also asked what rules different interest groups have supported in the debate about just distribution of the rent from the fishing grounds around Iceland. Article in Journal/Newspaper Iceland RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
institution Open Polar
collection RePEc (Research Papers in Economics)
op_collection_id ftrepec
language unknown
description The efficiency and equity consequences of different rules for the allocation of rights to utilize a common renewable resource such as the demersal fish stocks in the waters around Iceland is discussed. It is asked whether regulatory processes under consideration in Iceland can be reversed and at what cost. It is also asked which distributional mechanisms are generated when interest groups have managed to acquire or are bestowed with the authority to distribute rights to utilize a former common resource. An attempt is made to find out what characterizes a 'good' contract in terms of efficiency and equity. It is also asked what rules different interest groups have supported in the debate about just distribution of the rent from the fishing grounds around Iceland.
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author Matthíasson, Thorolfur
spellingShingle Matthíasson, Thorolfur
Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'
author_facet Matthíasson, Thorolfur
author_sort Matthíasson, Thorolfur
title Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'
title_short Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'
title_full Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'
title_fullStr Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'
title_full_unstemmed Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'
title_sort principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308-597X(92)90082-Z
genre Iceland
genre_facet Iceland
op_relation http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308-597X(92)90082-Z
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