Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation

• Main Authors: Kulmala, Soile, Levontin, Polina, Lindroos, Marko, Pintassilgo, Pedro
• Format: Report
• Language: unknown
• Subjects: Atlantic salmon
• Online Access: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59094/files/Kulmala_%20Soile%202.pdf

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort. Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies