Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis
This dissertation contains theoretical and empirical analyses on common property fisheries resources. The theoretical analysis focuses on a highly migratory fish stocks (HMFS) fishery, and examines the inefficiency caused by non-cooperative harvest. The empirical analysis focuses on a high seas fish...
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Oregon State University
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ftoregonstate:ir.library.oregonstate.edu:sb397b301 2024-09-15T17:59:40+00:00 Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis Naito, Toyokazu Polasky, Stephen Adams, Richard Sylvia, Gilbert Baek, Dae-Hyun Johnson, Rebecca Agriculture and Resource Economics Oregon State University. Graduate School https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/sb397b301 English [eng] eng unknown Oregon State University https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/sb397b301 Copyright Not Evaluated Fishery resources -- Econometric models Dissertation ftoregonstate 2024-07-22T18:06:06Z This dissertation contains theoretical and empirical analyses on common property fisheries resources. The theoretical analysis focuses on a highly migratory fish stocks (HMFS) fishery, and examines the inefficiency caused by non-cooperative harvest. The empirical analysis focuses on a high seas fishery and conducts an empirical test on the effects of the current and future number of harvesters on equilibrium harvest and resource rents. In the theoretical analysis, a two period, non-cooperative, game-theoretic model is developed for an WvIFS fishery. In each period, the fish stock migrate from the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal state into the high seas, where distant-water fishing (DWF) harvesters may harvest them. It is shown that having an EEZ improves total welfare by reducing total harvest and the degree of the welfare improvement increases when the number of harvesters in an HMFS fishery increases. It is also shown that new entrants to an HMFS fishery lead to a larger harvest and rent dissipation. With open- Redacted for Privacy access in the second stage, resource rent is totally dissipated for DWF harvesters but not for the coastal state harvesters, which still earn positive rent. In the empirical analysis, a dynamic Cournot model is used to predict the strategic behavior of harvesters engaged in a non-cooperative fishery on a common property resource. The model predicts that an increase in the current number of harvesters in a common property fishery will increase the collective equilibrium harvest level, but will reduce both the equilibrium harvest level and the current resource rent for the individual harvester. Also, an increase in the future number of harvesters increases all three equilibrium levels. These predictions are tested using data from the Japanese trawl fishery in the Bering Sea Donut Hole. The empirical results on the effect of changes in the current and future numbers of harvesters on the collective and individual harvest rates and resource rents are consistent with theory. Doctoral or Postdoctoral Thesis Bering Sea ScholarsArchive@OSU (Oregon State University) |
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ScholarsArchive@OSU (Oregon State University) |
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English unknown |
topic |
Fishery resources -- Econometric models |
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Fishery resources -- Econometric models Naito, Toyokazu Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis |
topic_facet |
Fishery resources -- Econometric models |
description |
This dissertation contains theoretical and empirical analyses on common property fisheries resources. The theoretical analysis focuses on a highly migratory fish stocks (HMFS) fishery, and examines the inefficiency caused by non-cooperative harvest. The empirical analysis focuses on a high seas fishery and conducts an empirical test on the effects of the current and future number of harvesters on equilibrium harvest and resource rents. In the theoretical analysis, a two period, non-cooperative, game-theoretic model is developed for an WvIFS fishery. In each period, the fish stock migrate from the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal state into the high seas, where distant-water fishing (DWF) harvesters may harvest them. It is shown that having an EEZ improves total welfare by reducing total harvest and the degree of the welfare improvement increases when the number of harvesters in an HMFS fishery increases. It is also shown that new entrants to an HMFS fishery lead to a larger harvest and rent dissipation. With open- Redacted for Privacy access in the second stage, resource rent is totally dissipated for DWF harvesters but not for the coastal state harvesters, which still earn positive rent. In the empirical analysis, a dynamic Cournot model is used to predict the strategic behavior of harvesters engaged in a non-cooperative fishery on a common property resource. The model predicts that an increase in the current number of harvesters in a common property fishery will increase the collective equilibrium harvest level, but will reduce both the equilibrium harvest level and the current resource rent for the individual harvester. Also, an increase in the future number of harvesters increases all three equilibrium levels. These predictions are tested using data from the Japanese trawl fishery in the Bering Sea Donut Hole. The empirical results on the effect of changes in the current and future numbers of harvesters on the collective and individual harvest rates and resource rents are consistent with theory. |
author2 |
Polasky, Stephen Adams, Richard Sylvia, Gilbert Baek, Dae-Hyun Johnson, Rebecca Agriculture and Resource Economics Oregon State University. Graduate School |
format |
Doctoral or Postdoctoral Thesis |
author |
Naito, Toyokazu |
author_facet |
Naito, Toyokazu |
author_sort |
Naito, Toyokazu |
title |
Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis |
title_short |
Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis |
title_full |
Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis |
title_fullStr |
Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis |
title_full_unstemmed |
Common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis |
title_sort |
common property fisheries resources : a game theoretic and empirical analysis |
publisher |
Oregon State University |
url |
https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/sb397b301 |
genre |
Bering Sea |
genre_facet |
Bering Sea |
op_relation |
https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/sb397b301 |
op_rights |
Copyright Not Evaluated |
_version_ |
1810436768256753664 |