What Are We Protecting? the Side-Effects of Spatial Closures As A tool to Mitigate Fisheries Bycatch

In the quest to limit the bycatch of non-target species, marine protected areas (MPAs) have been frequently utilized. MPAs are popular with ecologists and fishery managers because of their relative ease of administration, habitat protection benefits, and the widespread acceptance of MPAs as an instr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Abbott, Joshua, Haynie, Alan
Format: Other/Unknown Material
Language:English
unknown
Published: International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/bn999755d
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Summary:In the quest to limit the bycatch of non-target species, marine protected areas (MPAs) have been frequently utilized. MPAs are popular with ecologists and fishery managers because of their relative ease of administration, habitat protection benefits, and the widespread acceptance of MPAs as an instrument of choice for the ecosystem based management of fisheries. Despite these merits, we argue that MPAs may have significant limitations as bycatch-mitigation tools. First, closures displace fishermen from favored fishing grounds, potentially reducing the productivity of fishing effort and increasing the costs of fishing. Second, by reducing fishermens spatial choice set, closures can create significant spillovers by increasing pressure on other bycatch species. To provide empirical context for this analysis, we examine the closure of grounds in the Bering Sea flatfish trawl fishery for the protection of red king crab. We utilize detailed spatial data on fishing effort and catch before and after the closure to estimate zero-inflated negative binomial models of king crab and halibut bycatch. We demonstrate that while the MPAs have been effective in reducing crab bycatch, they also displaced fishermen to grounds with an increased density of an alternative bycatch species halibut. By utilizing novel simulation techniques from pre- and postclosure data, we demonstrate how MPAs are not cost-effective and how a policy that allows fishing over the entire grounds while providing a disincentive for both crab and halibut bycatch (as in a multispecies individual quota system) can achieve the multispecies bycatch conservation targets adopted by managers while increasing fishery profits. KEYWORDS: Fishery management, Bycatch Reduction, Fisheries economics