Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea - A Case of Trivial Cooperation

• Main Authors: Kulmala, Soile, Levontin, Polina, Lindroos, Marko, Pintassilgo, Pedro
• Format: Conference Object
• Language: English; unknown
• Published: International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
• Subjects: Baltic Sea; Fisheries; Atlantic salmon
• Online Access: https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/5999n4355

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over­exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), has been ostensible. Combining a two­stage game of four asymmetric players with a disaggregated bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the present Relative Stability Principle (RSP) is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is full non­cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under specific sharing schemes. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort, without compromising stock sustainability. Keywords: partition function, coalition formation, sharing rules, stability analysis, bioeconomic model, Atlantic salmon