Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery
This paper presents a quarterly, game-theoretic model of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel to study the fishing strategies of five players, the EU, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and the international fishery on the high seas. Data on the spatial distribution of fish catches 1977-2011 are used t...
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ftnorgehandelshs:oai:openaccess.nhh.no:11250/166820 2023-05-15T16:46:31+02:00 Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery Hannesson, Rögnvaldur 2013-04 application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166820 eng eng SNF Working paper;14/13 http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166820 VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 Working paper 2013 ftnorgehandelshs 2021-10-19T20:06:22Z This paper presents a quarterly, game-theoretic model of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel to study the fishing strategies of five players, the EU, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and the international fishery on the high seas. Data on the spatial distribution of fish catches 1977-2011 are used to model changes in the distribution of the mackerel stock. The Nash equilibrium solutions predict a severe decimation of the stock through overfishing, either by parties (Iceland, the Faeroe Islands) that refuse to cooperate, or by a general absence of cooperation. There is a wide discrepancy between this prediction and reality, as the stock seems only moderately overexploited or not at all, despite non-cooperation by Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. It is conjectured that these parties, and others, may have a degree of implicit cooperation that falls somewhat short of full cooperation but avoids the extreme destruction of the Nash equilibrium. This implicit cooperation can be seen as being maintained by a mutually assured destruction of the fisheries of all parties in case they go to the logical extremes of non-cooperation. Report Iceland Northeast Atlantic NHH Brage Open institutional repository (Norwegian School of Economics) Nash ENVELOPE(-62.350,-62.350,-74.233,-74.233) Norway |
institution |
Open Polar |
collection |
NHH Brage Open institutional repository (Norwegian School of Economics) |
op_collection_id |
ftnorgehandelshs |
language |
English |
topic |
VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 |
spellingShingle |
VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 Hannesson, Rögnvaldur Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery |
topic_facet |
VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 |
description |
This paper presents a quarterly, game-theoretic model of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel to study the fishing strategies of five players, the EU, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and the international fishery on the high seas. Data on the spatial distribution of fish catches 1977-2011 are used to model changes in the distribution of the mackerel stock. The Nash equilibrium solutions predict a severe decimation of the stock through overfishing, either by parties (Iceland, the Faeroe Islands) that refuse to cooperate, or by a general absence of cooperation. There is a wide discrepancy between this prediction and reality, as the stock seems only moderately overexploited or not at all, despite non-cooperation by Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. It is conjectured that these parties, and others, may have a degree of implicit cooperation that falls somewhat short of full cooperation but avoids the extreme destruction of the Nash equilibrium. This implicit cooperation can be seen as being maintained by a mutually assured destruction of the fisheries of all parties in case they go to the logical extremes of non-cooperation. |
format |
Report |
author |
Hannesson, Rögnvaldur |
author_facet |
Hannesson, Rögnvaldur |
author_sort |
Hannesson, Rögnvaldur |
title |
Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery |
title_short |
Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery |
title_full |
Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery |
title_fullStr |
Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery |
title_full_unstemmed |
Implicit cooperation? The northeast atlantic mackerel fishery |
title_sort |
implicit cooperation? the northeast atlantic mackerel fishery |
publisher |
SNF |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166820 |
long_lat |
ENVELOPE(-62.350,-62.350,-74.233,-74.233) |
geographic |
Nash Norway |
geographic_facet |
Nash Norway |
genre |
Iceland Northeast Atlantic |
genre_facet |
Iceland Northeast Atlantic |
op_relation |
Working paper;14/13 http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166820 |
_version_ |
1766036616599568384 |