Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery
The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic. After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of y...
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ftnorgehandelshs:oai:openaccess.nhh.no:11250/166294 2023-05-15T15:26:57+02:00 Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery Bjørndal, Trond Lindroos, Marko 2010-06 application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166294 eng eng SNF Working paper 2010:26 urn:issn:1503-2140 http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166294 VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920 Working paper 2010 ftnorgehandelshs 2021-10-19T20:05:29Z The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic. After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years. The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. This will be done in a game theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and initial stock size. The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (2007, 2010). The case of cooperative management is analysed for different cost parameters and starting values of the stock. An interesting result is that the optimal policy gives rise to pulse fishing. As this involves effort (and harvests) varying from year to year, potentially imposing substantial social costs on the industry in years when the fishery is closed, a policy of constant effort is also considered. Finally, non-cooperative management is analysed. Report atlantic cod Barents Sea Gadus morhua North Atlantic Northeast Atlantic NHH Brage Open institutional repository (Norwegian School of Economics) Barents Sea Norway |
institution |
Open Polar |
collection |
NHH Brage Open institutional repository (Norwegian School of Economics) |
op_collection_id |
ftnorgehandelshs |
language |
English |
topic |
VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920 |
spellingShingle |
VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920 Bjørndal, Trond Lindroos, Marko Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery |
topic_facet |
VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 VDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Fiskerifag: 920 |
description |
The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic. After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years. The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. This will be done in a game theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and initial stock size. The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (2007, 2010). The case of cooperative management is analysed for different cost parameters and starting values of the stock. An interesting result is that the optimal policy gives rise to pulse fishing. As this involves effort (and harvests) varying from year to year, potentially imposing substantial social costs on the industry in years when the fishery is closed, a policy of constant effort is also considered. Finally, non-cooperative management is analysed. |
format |
Report |
author |
Bjørndal, Trond Lindroos, Marko |
author_facet |
Bjørndal, Trond Lindroos, Marko |
author_sort |
Bjørndal, Trond |
title |
Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery |
title_short |
Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery |
title_full |
Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery |
title_fullStr |
Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery |
title_sort |
cooperative and non-cooperative management of the northeast atlantic cod fishery |
publisher |
SNF |
publishDate |
2010 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166294 |
geographic |
Barents Sea Norway |
geographic_facet |
Barents Sea Norway |
genre |
atlantic cod Barents Sea Gadus morhua North Atlantic Northeast Atlantic |
genre_facet |
atlantic cod Barents Sea Gadus morhua North Atlantic Northeast Atlantic |
op_relation |
Working paper 2010:26 urn:issn:1503-2140 http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166294 |
_version_ |
1766357417155624960 |