Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value
In this paper a game theoretic setting is applied to the management of North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries. The aim is to explore possible solutions for multilateral management by a regional conservation organization in accordance with the UN Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migrato...
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ftnewulisboa:oai:run.unl.pt:10362/89151 2023-05-15T17:30:49+02:00 Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value Costa-Duarte, Maria Clara Brasao, Ana Pintassilgo, Pedro 1999-06 http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89151 eng eng Nova SBE FEUNL Working Paper Series;354 Costa Duarte, Clara, Brasão, Ana and Pintassilgo, Pedro, Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value (June, 1999). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 354 http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89151 openAccess workingPaper 1999 ftnewulisboa 2022-05-01T14:10:30Z In this paper a game theoretic setting is applied to the management of North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries. The aim is to explore possible solutions for multilateral management by a regional conservation organization in accordance with the UN Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. The analysis is based on simulation results from a multi-gear age structured bioeconomic model developed for the North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries, both for the East and for the West Stock. A characteristic function game approach (c-game) is used to analyse cooperative aggreements. The analysis is focused on the sharing of the total net returns from the fishery. In particular, Shapley values are calculated assuming three players for the East Stock: EU (European Union), OCS (Other Coastal States) and DWFN (Distant Water Fishing Nations) and three players for the West Stock: USA (United States), CAN (Canada) and DWFN (Distant Water Fishing Nations). Moreover, the cooperative solution as well as coalition solutions assume that the possible strategies are fixed strategies (either constant level of effort or constant level of catch). The simulation results show, as expected, that significant gains can be attained from cooperation. A distribution of the gains according to the Shapley values, could guarantee cooperation in many situations. However, this case study points out some particular cases where this solution is not enough to guarantee cooperation namely, from all coastal states. N/A Report North Atlantic Repositório da Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL) Canada |
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Open Polar |
collection |
Repositório da Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL) |
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ftnewulisboa |
language |
English |
description |
In this paper a game theoretic setting is applied to the management of North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries. The aim is to explore possible solutions for multilateral management by a regional conservation organization in accordance with the UN Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. The analysis is based on simulation results from a multi-gear age structured bioeconomic model developed for the North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries, both for the East and for the West Stock. A characteristic function game approach (c-game) is used to analyse cooperative aggreements. The analysis is focused on the sharing of the total net returns from the fishery. In particular, Shapley values are calculated assuming three players for the East Stock: EU (European Union), OCS (Other Coastal States) and DWFN (Distant Water Fishing Nations) and three players for the West Stock: USA (United States), CAN (Canada) and DWFN (Distant Water Fishing Nations). Moreover, the cooperative solution as well as coalition solutions assume that the possible strategies are fixed strategies (either constant level of effort or constant level of catch). The simulation results show, as expected, that significant gains can be attained from cooperation. A distribution of the gains according to the Shapley values, could guarantee cooperation in many situations. However, this case study points out some particular cases where this solution is not enough to guarantee cooperation namely, from all coastal states. N/A |
format |
Report |
author |
Costa-Duarte, Maria Clara Brasao, Ana Pintassilgo, Pedro |
spellingShingle |
Costa-Duarte, Maria Clara Brasao, Ana Pintassilgo, Pedro Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value |
author_facet |
Costa-Duarte, Maria Clara Brasao, Ana Pintassilgo, Pedro |
author_sort |
Costa-Duarte, Maria Clara |
title |
Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value |
title_short |
Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value |
title_full |
Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value |
title_fullStr |
Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value |
title_full_unstemmed |
Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value |
title_sort |
management of nothern atlantic bluefin tuna an application of the shapley value |
publisher |
Nova SBE |
publishDate |
1999 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89151 |
geographic |
Canada |
geographic_facet |
Canada |
genre |
North Atlantic |
genre_facet |
North Atlantic |
op_relation |
FEUNL Working Paper Series;354 Costa Duarte, Clara, Brasão, Ana and Pintassilgo, Pedro, Management of Nothern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna An Application of the Shapley Value (June, 1999). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 354 http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89151 |
op_rights |
openAccess |
_version_ |
1766127912219574272 |