From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package

For decades past the IMF has been a byword for economic orthodoxy, which included disapproval of policy limits on cross-border capital flows. But in 2012 it announced a new "institutional view" giving more scope for capital flow management and in effect restricting the rights of capital ow...

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Main Authors: Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla, Wade, Robert H.
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Published: Taylor & Francis 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57034/
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rrip20/current#.U5bnzV9wY_w
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spelling ftlondoneconom:oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:57034 2024-05-19T07:42:35+00:00 From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla Wade, Robert H. 2015 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57034/ http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rrip20/current#.U5bnzV9wY_w eng eng Taylor & Francis Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla and Wade, Robert H. (2015) From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package. Review of International Political Economy, 22 (1). pp. 103-133. ISSN 0969-2290 HJ Public Finance Article NonPeerReviewed 2015 ftlondoneconom 2024-04-30T23:39:54Z For decades past the IMF has been a byword for economic orthodoxy, which included disapproval of policy limits on cross-border capital flows. But in 2012 it announced a new "institutional view" giving more scope for capital flow management and in effect restricting the rights of capital owners. The Fund's program in Iceland after the October 2008 crash helped to pave the way; it was the first time the Fund had endorsed capital controls in a developed country. The essay describes Iceland's boom and bust, and how the government and IMF tried to manage the crisis. With IMF support, the government implemented capital outflow controls, initially as an emergency response and then as a longer-term stabilization measure. The control regime evolved in a complicated "game", sometimes referred to in public debate as "the battle of Iceland", between the central bank implementing a professionally-led capital account liberalization strategy versus political parties seeking to turn the controls to their advantage. From this political economy perspective we explain why the "temporary" capital controls remain in place more than five years on. At the end we draw some broad lessons from the Iceland case for the financial booms and busts to come. Article in Journal/Newspaper Iceland The London School of Economics and Political Science: LSE Research Online
institution Open Polar
collection The London School of Economics and Political Science: LSE Research Online
op_collection_id ftlondoneconom
language English
topic HJ Public Finance
spellingShingle HJ Public Finance
Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla
Wade, Robert H.
From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package
topic_facet HJ Public Finance
description For decades past the IMF has been a byword for economic orthodoxy, which included disapproval of policy limits on cross-border capital flows. But in 2012 it announced a new "institutional view" giving more scope for capital flow management and in effect restricting the rights of capital owners. The Fund's program in Iceland after the October 2008 crash helped to pave the way; it was the first time the Fund had endorsed capital controls in a developed country. The essay describes Iceland's boom and bust, and how the government and IMF tried to manage the crisis. With IMF support, the government implemented capital outflow controls, initially as an emergency response and then as a longer-term stabilization measure. The control regime evolved in a complicated "game", sometimes referred to in public debate as "the battle of Iceland", between the central bank implementing a professionally-led capital account liberalization strategy versus political parties seeking to turn the controls to their advantage. From this political economy perspective we explain why the "temporary" capital controls remain in place more than five years on. At the end we draw some broad lessons from the Iceland case for the financial booms and busts to come.
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla
Wade, Robert H.
author_facet Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla
Wade, Robert H.
author_sort Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla
title From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package
title_short From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package
title_full From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package
title_fullStr From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package
title_full_unstemmed From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package
title_sort from control by capital to control of capital: iceland's boom and bust, and the imf's unorthodox rescue package
publisher Taylor & Francis
publishDate 2015
url http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57034/
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rrip20/current#.U5bnzV9wY_w
genre Iceland
genre_facet Iceland
op_relation Sigurgeirsdottir, Silla and Wade, Robert H. (2015) From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland's boom and bust, and the IMF's unorthodox rescue package. Review of International Political Economy, 22 (1). pp. 103-133. ISSN 0969-2290
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