The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records
In her path-breaking work, Elinor Ostrom provides theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that individuals often overcome the problem of collective action and arrange privately for the provision and allocation of public goods, including informal property rights. Ostrom has also found that loca...
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ftjijotc:oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/251 2023-10-09T21:52:48+02:00 The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records Eggertsson, Thráinn 2011-02-24 application/xml application/pdf https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.251 eng eng Ubiquity Press https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332/181 https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332/198 https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332 doi:10.18352/ijc.251 Copyright (c) 2011 The Author(s) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 International Journal of the Commons; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2011); 50-65 1875-0281 Coase Theorem Elinor Ostrom Iceland property rights info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article 2011 ftjijotc https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.251 2023-09-18T07:38:52Z In her path-breaking work, Elinor Ostrom provides theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that individuals often overcome the problem of collective action and arrange privately for the provision and allocation of public goods, including informal property rights. Ostrom has also found that local experimentation and self-governance often produce more effective results than rulemaking by the state. In his Coase Theorem, Ronald Coase arrives at a somewhat similar conclusion. Ostrom and Coase both recognize that high transaction costs can block private rule making. The new literature on institutions, however, has jettisoned the model of a benevolent welfare maximizing state: The state does not as a rule assign the license to create property rights to those who are most likely to provide efficient solutions. Still, private individuals often find various opportunities to supply their own informal rules and governance systems. In this paper, I examine recent evolution of property rights in Iceland’s national health records. My findings a) support the hypothesis that the demand for exclusive and well-defined property rights depends directly on the value of the assets in question; b) show that de facto rights, which are the effective economic property rights, can deviate from the corresponding de jure rights; c) demonstrate the relevance of the Coase-Ostrom insight concerning the role of private ordering; and d) provide evidence that competition between mental models can have a major role in the evolution of property rights. Article in Journal/Newspaper Iceland International Journal of the Commons International Journal of the Commons 5 1 50 |
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International Journal of the Commons |
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English |
topic |
Coase Theorem Elinor Ostrom Iceland property rights |
spellingShingle |
Coase Theorem Elinor Ostrom Iceland property rights Eggertsson, Thráinn The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records |
topic_facet |
Coase Theorem Elinor Ostrom Iceland property rights |
description |
In her path-breaking work, Elinor Ostrom provides theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that individuals often overcome the problem of collective action and arrange privately for the provision and allocation of public goods, including informal property rights. Ostrom has also found that local experimentation and self-governance often produce more effective results than rulemaking by the state. In his Coase Theorem, Ronald Coase arrives at a somewhat similar conclusion. Ostrom and Coase both recognize that high transaction costs can block private rule making. The new literature on institutions, however, has jettisoned the model of a benevolent welfare maximizing state: The state does not as a rule assign the license to create property rights to those who are most likely to provide efficient solutions. Still, private individuals often find various opportunities to supply their own informal rules and governance systems. In this paper, I examine recent evolution of property rights in Iceland’s national health records. My findings a) support the hypothesis that the demand for exclusive and well-defined property rights depends directly on the value of the assets in question; b) show that de facto rights, which are the effective economic property rights, can deviate from the corresponding de jure rights; c) demonstrate the relevance of the Coase-Ostrom insight concerning the role of private ordering; and d) provide evidence that competition between mental models can have a major role in the evolution of property rights. |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Eggertsson, Thráinn |
author_facet |
Eggertsson, Thráinn |
author_sort |
Eggertsson, Thráinn |
title |
The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records |
title_short |
The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records |
title_full |
The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records |
title_fullStr |
The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records |
title_full_unstemmed |
The evolution of property rights: The strange case of Iceland’s health records |
title_sort |
evolution of property rights: the strange case of iceland’s health records |
publisher |
Ubiquity Press |
publishDate |
2011 |
url |
https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.251 |
genre |
Iceland |
genre_facet |
Iceland |
op_source |
International Journal of the Commons; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2011); 50-65 1875-0281 |
op_relation |
https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332/181 https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332/198 https://account.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/up-j-ijc/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3A10-1-101332 doi:10.18352/ijc.251 |
op_rights |
Copyright (c) 2011 The Author(s) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
op_doi |
https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.251 |
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International Journal of the Commons |
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5 |
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1 |
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50 |
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1779315977294446592 |