Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode
Bošković i Kant razvijaju sličnu teoriju tvari uz pomoć odbojne i privlačne sile, pa bi se moglo pretpostaviti da je Kant poznavao Boškovićevu Teoriju prirodne filozofije. Kant u Metafizičkim osnovama prirodne znanosti razlikuje unutar metafizike prirode njezin čisti transcendentalni dio i posebnu (...
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Bošković i Kant razvijaju sličnu teoriju tvari uz pomoć odbojne i privlačne sile, pa bi se moglo pretpostaviti da je Kant poznavao Boškovićevu Teoriju prirodne filozofije. Kant u Metafizičkim osnovama prirodne znanosti razlikuje unutar metafizike prirode njezin čisti transcendentalni dio i posebnu (spooijalnu) metafiziku prirode. Transcendentalni dio metafizike prirode bavi se zakonima koji omogućavaju pojam prirode općenito bez obzira na neki određeni predmet iskustva, dakle neodređeno u pogledu naravi bilo koje stvari osjetilnog svijeta. Tome suprotno posebna se metafizika bavi posebnom naravi neke određene vrste stvari. Već prema tome da li razmatra misleću ili tjelesnu prirodu, ona je metafizička psihologija ili metafizička•fizika, tj. kao u Kritici čistoga uma metafizika tjelesne prirode. Ona dakle tako primjenjuje principe transcendentalnog dijela na dvije vrste predmeta osjetila. Metafizičke osnove prirodnih znanosti polaze od pojma prirode kao cjelokupnosti stvari ukoliko one mogu biti predmeta osjetila, dakle iskustva a pri tom se misli cjelina pojavnosti, ili osjetilni svijet uz isključenje svih neosjetilnih predmeta. Transcendentalni dio metafizike bavi se jedino i isključivo zakonima koji čine mogućim pojam prirode općenito. Iako ovaj transcendentalni dio metafizike ne zalazi dublje u razliku koja postoji između predmeta vanjskog i unutrašnjeg osjetila, iako se on bavi, bez odnosa na ma koji određeni iskustveni objekt, samo zakonima koji omogućavaju pojam prirode uopće, ipak proučava baš zakone i pojmove prirode jedino u njihovu odnosu na iskustvene objekte i u odnosu na stvari osjetilnog svijeta. U filozofiji prirode Kant razlikuje racionalnu i empirijsku fiziku :i psihologiju. Racionalna neiskustvena fizika čista je ili primijenjena. Prvoj su predmet vanjske pojave općenito i njezina su načela uvjeti pojave općenito, a drugoj posebni vanjski pojavni predmeti, ali su još načela a priori. Obje sačinjavaju metafiziku prirode. Kant, prema Hoppeu, ne upotrebljava riječ transcendentalno jednoznačno. Iako izričito kaže: transcendentalno i transcendentno nije isto (Kritika, B 352) on upotrebljava transcendentalno i u smislu transcendentnog, tj. u smislu: Transcendentalna upotreba, tj. upotreba koja presiže granice iskustva (Kritika, B 353). Potom: transcendentalno, tj. samo čistom umu misliv od svijeta različit temelj uređenja svijeta njegove povezanosti (Kritika, B 723/724). U MetafiZičkim osnovama prirodne znanosti transcendentalno upotrebljava u smislu onoga što se odnosi na uvjete mogućnosti iskustva (Hoppe, Kants Theorie der Physik, str. 33-34). Transcendentalni dio metafizike nije stoga nikakva ontologija u tradicionalnom pretkritičkom smislu. Posebna metafizika tjelesne prirode istražuje posebnu vrst stvari o kojim je dan iskustveni pojam, ali tako da e osim onoga što u tom pojmu leži, ne upotrebljava nikakav drugi iskustveni princip za njegovu spoznaju. Ovaj iskustveni pojam koji leži u temelju posebne metafizike tjelesne prirode jest tvar. Tvar je ono što se u prostoru giba (foronomija), što prostor, ispunjava (dinamika) i što kao takvo ima silu gibanja (mehanika). Empirijski pojam tvari ima predikate gibanja, ispunjavanja prostora i neproničnosti kako bi mogao biti dan objekt vanjskog osjetila. Ovakav iskustveni pojam tvari daje protežnu prirodu općenito pa je stoga moguće pojam tvari, raščlaniti prema kategorijama i konstituirati protežnu prirodu. Budući da principi čistog razuma veže prvenstveno za protežnu prirodu u tome se ne razlikuju od spoznaja a priori do kojih dolazi posebna metafizika protežne prirode, ako se ona od transcendentalnog dijela metafizike prirode samo po tome razlikuje što su njezini predmet•i protežni. Kant u Metafizičkim osnovama kaže da opća metafizika uvijek kad su joj potrebni primjeri, dakle zorovi, kako bi mogla pribaviti čistim pojmovima razuma značenje, mora ih uzeti iz opće nauke tijela (Körperlehre), dakle iz oblika i principa vanjskog zora, jer su joj bez njih pojmovi prazni. Međutim, opća metafizika nije transcendentalni dio metafizike prirode, jer se Kant ograđuje od općeg sustava metafizike koja bi htjela doseći ono što presiže sve granice iskustva. Opću nekritičku metafiziku može se realizirati jedino ako se njezini pojmovi dovedu u odnos s vanjskim zorovima. Za razliku od transcendentalnog dijela metafizike prirode Metafizičke osnove ne istražuju uvjete mogućnosti iskustva prirode općenito, čak niti protežne prirode općenito, već kako nam može biti dana priroda, čiji su opći zakoni već poznati jer su oni kao 'takvi pomoću kategorija i principa čistog razuma konstituirani. Samo gibanjem vanjska osjetila mogu biti aficirana. Zbog toga Metafizičke osnove polaze od određenja tvari kao gibanja u prostoru. Ali ovo. određenje pojma, tvari nije postignuto primjenom transcendentalnih principa, pogotovo ne primjenom kategorija. Pitanje je stoga da li je pojam gibajućeg uopće za tvar objektivno važeći. Ovaj pojam ne može biti dokazan a priori. Budući da bez gibanja nema ni svijesti ni iskustva izgleda da ono mora miti a priori postulirano iako kao empirijski pojam U svojoj mogućnosti ne može biti sagledano. Ovaj nezadovoljavajući empirijski početak važi i za status gibajućih sila čije je uvođenje nužno prvenstveno zbog mogućnosti primjene matematike na vanjske predmete, koji međutim i sami proizlaze iz pojma gibanja kao temeljnog određenja svih vanjskih predmeta. Sile kao i gibanje ne mogu biti dalje objašnjene. Pogotovu stoga ne može se pomoću njih a priori isključiti atomističko objašnjavanje prirode. Atomizam samo gubi svojstvo da bude jedino moguća teorija objašnjavanja neproničnosti po Kantu u Metafizičkim osnovama. Ali gibajuće sile dinamizma ostaju puke hipoteze koje može pravdati jedino primjena matematike koju ove sile omogućavaju. Ali je, s obzirom na metafiziku, budući da ona sile gibanja ne može zajamčiti a priori, promašena njezina zadaća da omogući i ozbilji prijelaz na matematičku prirodnu znanost. Usprkos tvrdnji i uvjeravanju da se pomoću sila može utemeljiti matematička prirodna znanost, Kant se dvoumi da li bi se tvar, kad bi je se pretvorilo u temeljne sile odbojnosti i privlačnosti, moglo uistinu konstruirati. Metafizičke osnove ne daju odgovor na pitanje kako su mogući pomoću njihovog čistog dijela zakoni iskustva na kojima počiva fizika. Bošković and Kant develop a similar theory using repulsive and attractive forces, so it is possible to presume that Kant made use of Bošković's Theory of Natural Philosophy. In his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant distinguishes within the metaphysics of nature between its pure, transcendental part and the special metaphysics of nature. The transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature deals with laws that make possible the concept of nature in general, regardless of some specific object of experience, undefined, therefore as to the nature of any thing of the sensible world. Special metaphysics, as opposed to this, deals with the special nature of certain specific classes of things. It is either the metaphysics of psychology or the metaphysics of .physics, depending on whether one is discussing intellectual or physical nature, i.e. such as the metaphysics of physical nature .in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this manner it applies the principles of the transcendental part to two classes of sensible objects. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science start from the concept of nature as the totality of things in as much as they can be the object of senses, therefore experience, thinking in this case, of the entirety of phenomenality, i.e. the sensible world with exclusion of all non-sensible things. The transcendental part of metaphysics deals exclusively with laws that make possible the concept of nature tin general. Although this transcendental part of metaphysics does not delve deeper into differences, that exist between objects of the external and internal senses, although does deal, without relation to any specific experiential object, just with the laws, that make the concept of nature possible at all, it does study those very laws and concepts of nature exclusively in their relation to experiential objects and in relation to things of the sensible world. In the philosophy of nature, Kant distinguishes between rational and empirical physics and psychology. Rational nonexperiential physics is either pure or applied. The object of the first are external phenomena in general, and its principles are conditions of phenomena in general, while special external phenomenal objects are relevant to the second, but its principles are a priori. They both constitute .the metaphysics of nature. Kant, according to Hoppe, does not use the word »transcendental« univalently. Although he expressly states: the transcendental and the transcendent are not one and the same (The Critique, B 352) he uses transcendental in the sense of the transcendent, i.e. in the sense: transcendental usage, i.e. usage, that goes .beyond the order of experience (The Critique, B 353). Then: transcendental i.e. a foundation for' organization of the world which is only conceivable to pure reason as distinct from the world, and its interaction (Critique, B 723/724). In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, transcendental is used in the sense of what relates to the conditions of the possibility of experience (Hoppe, Kants Theorie der Physik, pp. 33-34). The transcendental part of metaphysics is therefore not any sort of ontology in the traditional, precritical sense. The special metaphysics of physical nature explores a special class of objects for which an experiential concept is given, but such that aside from what •lies in •that concept, no other experiential principle is used for its cognition. The experiential concept lying alt the foundation of the special metaphysics of physical nature is matter. Matter is what moves through space (phoroomy), what fills space (dynamics) and what, as such, has the force of motion (mechanics). The empirical concept of matter has predicates of motion, filling of space and impenetrability so that it could be a given object of external sense. This experiential notion of substances produces extensive nature in general so it is therefore possible to dissect the concept of matter according to category and constitute extensive nature. Since the principles of pure reason apply primarily to extensive nature, they do not differ in this sense a priori from the cognitions that the special metaphysics of extensive nature attains, if it is only distinguished from the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature by the fact that its objects are extensive. In Metaphyisal Foundations, Kant states that general metaphysics, whenever it needs examples, therefore intuitions, in order to provide pure concepts of reason with meaning, must extract them from the general science of the body (Körperlehre), therefore from the form and principle of external intuition, for it is empty without their concepts. However, general metaphysics is not a transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, for Kant holds back from a general system of metaphysics which would attain that which goes beyond all limits of experience. A general non-critical metaphysics can only be reatized in its concepts are brought into relation with external viewpoints. As opposed to the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, Metaphysical Foundations are not seeking conditions for the possibility of experience of nature is general, not even of extensive nature in .general but, how to us can nature be given, whose general laws are already known since as such, with the categories and principles of pure reason they are constituted. Only through movement of external senses can they be affected. For this reason Metaphysical Foundations starts from definition of matter as 'motion in space. But this definition of the concept of matter is not achieved by applying the transcendental principle, especially not through application o category. It is therefore questionable whether the concept of motion is at all objectively valid for matter. This notion can not be a priori proven. Since without motion there can be no awareness or experience, it seems that it must be a priori postulated although it can not be considered in its possibility as an empirical concept. This unsatisfactory empirical beginning also applies to the status of moving forces, the introduction of which is primarily necessary due to the possibility of applyng mathematics to external objects, which, however, also pass from the concept of motion as the fundamental determination of all external objects. Forces such as motion can not be explained any further. Especially since with them it is not possible to a priori exclude an atomistic explanation of nature. Atomism simply loses its property of being the only possible theory for explaining impenetrability according to Kant in Metaphysical Foundations. But –moving forces of dynamism remain mere hypotheses which can only justify application of the mathematics that these forces make possible. As to metaphysics, however, since it can not guarantee forces of motion a priori, its task of enabling and realizing a transition to the mathematical natural science has failed. In Spite of the claim and argument that it is possible, with the help of forces, to found the natural science of mathematics, Kant oscillates as to whether matter, when it is transformed into the elementary forces of repulsion an attraction, could actually be constituted. Metaphysical Foundations do not provide an answer to the question of how the laws of experience upon which physics is based are possible through their pure part. |
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Slade, Genoveva; Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest filozofije,Zagreb, Hrvatska |
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Slade, Genoveva; Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest filozofije,Zagreb, Hrvatska Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode |
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Slade, Genoveva; Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest filozofije,Zagreb, Hrvatska |
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Slade, Genoveva; Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest filozofije,Zagreb, Hrvatska |
title |
Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode |
title_short |
Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode |
title_full |
Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode |
title_fullStr |
Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode |
title_full_unstemmed |
Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode |
title_sort |
boškovićeva i kantova filozofija prirode |
publisher |
Institute of Philosophy; filozof@ifzg.hr |
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1985 |
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http://hrcak.srce.hr/87502 http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/130173 |
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ENVELOPE(40.287,40.287,64.964,64.964) ENVELOPE(13.133,13.133,66.320,66.320) |
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Kad’ Sila |
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Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine; Vol.11. No.1-2 (21-22) |
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http://hrcak.srce.hr/87502 http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/130173 |
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fthrcak:oai:hrcak.srce.hr:87502 2023-05-15T18:14:27+02:00 Boškovićeva i Kantova filozofija prirode Bošković's and Kant's Philosophy of Nature Slade, Genoveva; Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za povijest filozofije,Zagreb, Hrvatska 1985-12-02 PDF http://hrcak.srce.hr/87502 http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/130173 hr hrv Institute of Philosophy; filozof@ifzg.hr http://hrcak.srce.hr/87502 http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/130173 Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine; Vol.11. No.1-2 (21-22) text 1985 fthrcak 2012-10-27T18:39:39Z Bošković i Kant razvijaju sličnu teoriju tvari uz pomoć odbojne i privlačne sile, pa bi se moglo pretpostaviti da je Kant poznavao Boškovićevu Teoriju prirodne filozofije. Kant u Metafizičkim osnovama prirodne znanosti razlikuje unutar metafizike prirode njezin čisti transcendentalni dio i posebnu (spooijalnu) metafiziku prirode. Transcendentalni dio metafizike prirode bavi se zakonima koji omogućavaju pojam prirode općenito bez obzira na neki određeni predmet iskustva, dakle neodređeno u pogledu naravi bilo koje stvari osjetilnog svijeta. Tome suprotno posebna se metafizika bavi posebnom naravi neke određene vrste stvari. Već prema tome da li razmatra misleću ili tjelesnu prirodu, ona je metafizička psihologija ili metafizička•fizika, tj. kao u Kritici čistoga uma metafizika tjelesne prirode. Ona dakle tako primjenjuje principe transcendentalnog dijela na dvije vrste predmeta osjetila. Metafizičke osnove prirodnih znanosti polaze od pojma prirode kao cjelokupnosti stvari ukoliko one mogu biti predmeta osjetila, dakle iskustva a pri tom se misli cjelina pojavnosti, ili osjetilni svijet uz isključenje svih neosjetilnih predmeta. Transcendentalni dio metafizike bavi se jedino i isključivo zakonima koji čine mogućim pojam prirode općenito. Iako ovaj transcendentalni dio metafizike ne zalazi dublje u razliku koja postoji između predmeta vanjskog i unutrašnjeg osjetila, iako se on bavi, bez odnosa na ma koji određeni iskustveni objekt, samo zakonima koji omogućavaju pojam prirode uopće, ipak proučava baš zakone i pojmove prirode jedino u njihovu odnosu na iskustvene objekte i u odnosu na stvari osjetilnog svijeta. U filozofiji prirode Kant razlikuje racionalnu i empirijsku fiziku :i psihologiju. Racionalna neiskustvena fizika čista je ili primijenjena. Prvoj su predmet vanjske pojave općenito i njezina su načela uvjeti pojave općenito, a drugoj posebni vanjski pojavni predmeti, ali su još načela a priori. Obje sačinjavaju metafiziku prirode. Kant, prema Hoppeu, ne upotrebljava riječ transcendentalno jednoznačno. Iako izričito kaže: transcendentalno i transcendentno nije isto (Kritika, B 352) on upotrebljava transcendentalno i u smislu transcendentnog, tj. u smislu: Transcendentalna upotreba, tj. upotreba koja presiže granice iskustva (Kritika, B 353). Potom: transcendentalno, tj. samo čistom umu misliv od svijeta različit temelj uređenja svijeta njegove povezanosti (Kritika, B 723/724). U MetafiZičkim osnovama prirodne znanosti transcendentalno upotrebljava u smislu onoga što se odnosi na uvjete mogućnosti iskustva (Hoppe, Kants Theorie der Physik, str. 33-34). Transcendentalni dio metafizike nije stoga nikakva ontologija u tradicionalnom pretkritičkom smislu. Posebna metafizika tjelesne prirode istražuje posebnu vrst stvari o kojim je dan iskustveni pojam, ali tako da e osim onoga što u tom pojmu leži, ne upotrebljava nikakav drugi iskustveni princip za njegovu spoznaju. Ovaj iskustveni pojam koji leži u temelju posebne metafizike tjelesne prirode jest tvar. Tvar je ono što se u prostoru giba (foronomija), što prostor, ispunjava (dinamika) i što kao takvo ima silu gibanja (mehanika). Empirijski pojam tvari ima predikate gibanja, ispunjavanja prostora i neproničnosti kako bi mogao biti dan objekt vanjskog osjetila. Ovakav iskustveni pojam tvari daje protežnu prirodu općenito pa je stoga moguće pojam tvari, raščlaniti prema kategorijama i konstituirati protežnu prirodu. Budući da principi čistog razuma veže prvenstveno za protežnu prirodu u tome se ne razlikuju od spoznaja a priori do kojih dolazi posebna metafizika protežne prirode, ako se ona od transcendentalnog dijela metafizike prirode samo po tome razlikuje što su njezini predmet•i protežni. Kant u Metafizičkim osnovama kaže da opća metafizika uvijek kad su joj potrebni primjeri, dakle zorovi, kako bi mogla pribaviti čistim pojmovima razuma značenje, mora ih uzeti iz opće nauke tijela (Körperlehre), dakle iz oblika i principa vanjskog zora, jer su joj bez njih pojmovi prazni. Međutim, opća metafizika nije transcendentalni dio metafizike prirode, jer se Kant ograđuje od općeg sustava metafizike koja bi htjela doseći ono što presiže sve granice iskustva. Opću nekritičku metafiziku može se realizirati jedino ako se njezini pojmovi dovedu u odnos s vanjskim zorovima. Za razliku od transcendentalnog dijela metafizike prirode Metafizičke osnove ne istražuju uvjete mogućnosti iskustva prirode općenito, čak niti protežne prirode općenito, već kako nam može biti dana priroda, čiji su opći zakoni već poznati jer su oni kao 'takvi pomoću kategorija i principa čistog razuma konstituirani. Samo gibanjem vanjska osjetila mogu biti aficirana. Zbog toga Metafizičke osnove polaze od određenja tvari kao gibanja u prostoru. Ali ovo. određenje pojma, tvari nije postignuto primjenom transcendentalnih principa, pogotovo ne primjenom kategorija. Pitanje je stoga da li je pojam gibajućeg uopće za tvar objektivno važeći. Ovaj pojam ne može biti dokazan a priori. Budući da bez gibanja nema ni svijesti ni iskustva izgleda da ono mora miti a priori postulirano iako kao empirijski pojam U svojoj mogućnosti ne može biti sagledano. Ovaj nezadovoljavajući empirijski početak važi i za status gibajućih sila čije je uvođenje nužno prvenstveno zbog mogućnosti primjene matematike na vanjske predmete, koji međutim i sami proizlaze iz pojma gibanja kao temeljnog određenja svih vanjskih predmeta. Sile kao i gibanje ne mogu biti dalje objašnjene. Pogotovu stoga ne može se pomoću njih a priori isključiti atomističko objašnjavanje prirode. Atomizam samo gubi svojstvo da bude jedino moguća teorija objašnjavanja neproničnosti po Kantu u Metafizičkim osnovama. Ali gibajuće sile dinamizma ostaju puke hipoteze koje može pravdati jedino primjena matematike koju ove sile omogućavaju. Ali je, s obzirom na metafiziku, budući da ona sile gibanja ne može zajamčiti a priori, promašena njezina zadaća da omogući i ozbilji prijelaz na matematičku prirodnu znanost. Usprkos tvrdnji i uvjeravanju da se pomoću sila može utemeljiti matematička prirodna znanost, Kant se dvoumi da li bi se tvar, kad bi je se pretvorilo u temeljne sile odbojnosti i privlačnosti, moglo uistinu konstruirati. Metafizičke osnove ne daju odgovor na pitanje kako su mogući pomoću njihovog čistog dijela zakoni iskustva na kojima počiva fizika. Bošković and Kant develop a similar theory using repulsive and attractive forces, so it is possible to presume that Kant made use of Bošković's Theory of Natural Philosophy. In his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant distinguishes within the metaphysics of nature between its pure, transcendental part and the special metaphysics of nature. The transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature deals with laws that make possible the concept of nature in general, regardless of some specific object of experience, undefined, therefore as to the nature of any thing of the sensible world. Special metaphysics, as opposed to this, deals with the special nature of certain specific classes of things. It is either the metaphysics of psychology or the metaphysics of .physics, depending on whether one is discussing intellectual or physical nature, i.e. such as the metaphysics of physical nature .in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this manner it applies the principles of the transcendental part to two classes of sensible objects. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science start from the concept of nature as the totality of things in as much as they can be the object of senses, therefore experience, thinking in this case, of the entirety of phenomenality, i.e. the sensible world with exclusion of all non-sensible things. The transcendental part of metaphysics deals exclusively with laws that make possible the concept of nature tin general. Although this transcendental part of metaphysics does not delve deeper into differences, that exist between objects of the external and internal senses, although does deal, without relation to any specific experiential object, just with the laws, that make the concept of nature possible at all, it does study those very laws and concepts of nature exclusively in their relation to experiential objects and in relation to things of the sensible world. In the philosophy of nature, Kant distinguishes between rational and empirical physics and psychology. Rational nonexperiential physics is either pure or applied. The object of the first are external phenomena in general, and its principles are conditions of phenomena in general, while special external phenomenal objects are relevant to the second, but its principles are a priori. They both constitute .the metaphysics of nature. Kant, according to Hoppe, does not use the word »transcendental« univalently. Although he expressly states: the transcendental and the transcendent are not one and the same (The Critique, B 352) he uses transcendental in the sense of the transcendent, i.e. in the sense: transcendental usage, i.e. usage, that goes .beyond the order of experience (The Critique, B 353). Then: transcendental i.e. a foundation for' organization of the world which is only conceivable to pure reason as distinct from the world, and its interaction (Critique, B 723/724). In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, transcendental is used in the sense of what relates to the conditions of the possibility of experience (Hoppe, Kants Theorie der Physik, pp. 33-34). The transcendental part of metaphysics is therefore not any sort of ontology in the traditional, precritical sense. The special metaphysics of physical nature explores a special class of objects for which an experiential concept is given, but such that aside from what •lies in •that concept, no other experiential principle is used for its cognition. The experiential concept lying alt the foundation of the special metaphysics of physical nature is matter. Matter is what moves through space (phoroomy), what fills space (dynamics) and what, as such, has the force of motion (mechanics). The empirical concept of matter has predicates of motion, filling of space and impenetrability so that it could be a given object of external sense. This experiential notion of substances produces extensive nature in general so it is therefore possible to dissect the concept of matter according to category and constitute extensive nature. Since the principles of pure reason apply primarily to extensive nature, they do not differ in this sense a priori from the cognitions that the special metaphysics of extensive nature attains, if it is only distinguished from the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature by the fact that its objects are extensive. In Metaphyisal Foundations, Kant states that general metaphysics, whenever it needs examples, therefore intuitions, in order to provide pure concepts of reason with meaning, must extract them from the general science of the body (Körperlehre), therefore from the form and principle of external intuition, for it is empty without their concepts. However, general metaphysics is not a transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, for Kant holds back from a general system of metaphysics which would attain that which goes beyond all limits of experience. A general non-critical metaphysics can only be reatized in its concepts are brought into relation with external viewpoints. As opposed to the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, Metaphysical Foundations are not seeking conditions for the possibility of experience of nature is general, not even of extensive nature in .general but, how to us can nature be given, whose general laws are already known since as such, with the categories and principles of pure reason they are constituted. Only through movement of external senses can they be affected. For this reason Metaphysical Foundations starts from definition of matter as 'motion in space. But this definition of the concept of matter is not achieved by applying the transcendental principle, especially not through application o category. It is therefore questionable whether the concept of motion is at all objectively valid for matter. This notion can not be a priori proven. Since without motion there can be no awareness or experience, it seems that it must be a priori postulated although it can not be considered in its possibility as an empirical concept. This unsatisfactory empirical beginning also applies to the status of moving forces, the introduction of which is primarily necessary due to the possibility of applyng mathematics to external objects, which, however, also pass from the concept of motion as the fundamental determination of all external objects. Forces such as motion can not be explained any further. Especially since with them it is not possible to a priori exclude an atomistic explanation of nature. Atomism simply loses its property of being the only possible theory for explaining impenetrability according to Kant in Metaphysical Foundations. But –moving forces of dynamism remain mere hypotheses which can only justify application of the mathematics that these forces make possible. As to metaphysics, however, since it can not guarantee forces of motion a priori, its task of enabling and realizing a transition to the mathematical natural science has failed. In Spite of the claim and argument that it is possible, with the help of forces, to found the natural science of mathematics, Kant oscillates as to whether matter, when it is transformed into the elementary forces of repulsion an attraction, could actually be constituted. Metaphysical Foundations do not provide an answer to the question of how the laws of experience upon which physics is based are possible through their pure part. Text sami Hrčak - Portal of scientific journals of Croatia Kad’ ENVELOPE(40.287,40.287,64.964,64.964) Sila ENVELOPE(13.133,13.133,66.320,66.320) |