Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, cl...
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2005
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fthighwire:oai:open-archive.highwire.org:restud:72/1/247 2023-05-15T17:52:18+02:00 Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis Turner, Matthew Weninger, Quinn 2005-01-01 00:00:00.0 text/html http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/72/1/247 https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00331 en eng Oxford University Press http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/72/1/247 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00331 Copyright (C) 2005, Review of Economic Studies Ltd Original Articles TEXT 2005 fthighwire https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00331 2016-11-16T18:32:56Z Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, “meetings with costly participation”, (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries. Text Ocean quahog HighWire Press (Stanford University) Review of Economic Studies 72 1 247 268 |
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HighWire Press (Stanford University) |
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English |
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Original Articles |
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Original Articles Turner, Matthew Weninger, Quinn Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis |
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Original Articles |
description |
Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, “meetings with costly participation”, (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries. |
format |
Text |
author |
Turner, Matthew Weninger, Quinn |
author_facet |
Turner, Matthew Weninger, Quinn |
author_sort |
Turner, Matthew |
title |
Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis |
title_short |
Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis |
title_full |
Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis |
title_fullStr |
Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis |
title_full_unstemmed |
Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis |
title_sort |
meetings with costly participation: an empirical analysis |
publisher |
Oxford University Press |
publishDate |
2005 |
url |
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/72/1/247 https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00331 |
genre |
Ocean quahog |
genre_facet |
Ocean quahog |
op_relation |
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/72/1/247 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00331 |
op_rights |
Copyright (C) 2005, Review of Economic Studies Ltd |
op_doi |
https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00331 |
container_title |
Review of Economic Studies |
container_volume |
72 |
container_issue |
1 |
container_start_page |
247 |
op_container_end_page |
268 |
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1766159686364561408 |