| Summary: | The background for and the strategic context of this thesis is the threat posed by Russian submarines to Norway and NATO in the North Atlantic. In light of this, the study examines the significance of the P-8 and the trilateral partnership of Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, by asking two research questions: - What is the operational significance of the P-8 and the trilateral partnership? - How does the P-8 and the trilateral partnership influence Norwegian security policy? It is an explorative and inductive study, which answers the research questions through a qualitative analysis. The thesis uses deterrence, crisis stability and maritime airpower theory, as well as Norwegian Security policy and defence concept, with emphasis on integration and reassurance to frame the discussion. The thesis concludes that the P-8 will provide Norwegian decision-makers with an agile platform with significantly improved capability for ASW and ISR. The trilateral partnership integrates the three partner nations and improves NATOs ASW capability when facing Russian submarines in the North Atlantic. The P-8 and the partnership influence deterrence positively by integrating Norway, NATO and the US, and provide tools for improving crisis stability. However, given the impermanency of American Poseidons, there is a need to establish a trilateral P-8 concept that merges training, exorcises and operations as a signal of presence and integration in the North Atlantic. The contribution of the P-8 in Norway’s policy of reassuring Russia is important as Norway increasingly develops a force structure with so-called offensive strategic capabilities. Of particular importance to reassurance is enhancements in intelligence contributions. Provided the strategic context, improved capabilities and the Norwegian force structure, the influence of the P-8 is decisive for the Norwegian security policy. Bakgrunnen for denne oppgaven og den strategiske konteksten er trusselen Russiske ubåter utgjør for Norge og NATO i Nord-Atlanteren. I ...
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