The Myth of Strategic Airpower: Ignoring the Nature of War

• Main Author: Marletto, Michael P.
• Other Authors: NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
• Format: Text
• Language: English
• Published: 1998
• Subjects: Humanities and History; Military Operations; Strategy and Tactics; *WARFARE; *THEORY; *JAPAN; *STRATEGIC BOMBING; *PERSIAN GULF WAR; *AIR POWER; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; SECOND WORLD WAR; IRAQ; CIVILIAN POPULATION; LEADERSHIP; GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN); LESSONS LEARNED; MILITARY HISTORY; GIULIO DOUHET; JOHN WARDEN; TRINITY OF WAR; WILL OF THE PEOPLE; CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ; WILL OF THE ENEMY; *MYTHS; NATURE OF WAR; Warden; North Atlantic
• Online Access: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA444145; http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA444145

In the aftermath of the carnage of World War I, military theorists struggled to come to grips with the changing character and conduct of war. The full effects of industrialization had led to warfare on a scale and scope far surpassing any pre-war conceptions. The quick victory envisioned in 1914 was lost in the realities of stalemate on the Western Front, the cold waters of the North Atlantic, and for the first time in the skies over all of the belligerents. Could this new third dimension of aerial warfare fulfill the quest for the quick decisive victory that had eluded commanders in World War I? From early air power theorists came the resounding answer -- yes! The vision of the advocates of warfare in this new dimension offered a new panacea. Free from the constraints of the mud and gore of ground combat, and able to strike in depth directly at strategic targets, air power promised a swift decision. Unfortunately, these new prophets, while correctly recognizing the changes in the character and conduct of warfare, had ignored the enduring nature of war, which was first addressed by the 19th century military strategist Carl von Clausewitz. For this enduring nature would expose their theories for what they were -- bankrupt theories offering seductive arguments that failed to stand up to rigorous theoretical examination. This paper will examine the theories of the earliest air power proponent, Giulio Douhet, and a modern theorist, John Warden, to demonstrate that the common thread missing from their ideas is an understanding of the enduring nature of war. As a result of this missing component, they and other air power zealots have consistently credited strategic air power with war-winning capabilities that simply do not exist.