Boris Yeltsin and the First Chechen War

• Main Authors: Hart, Steven, Hess, Derek
• Other Authors: NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
• Format: Text
• Language: English
• Published: 2001
• Subjects: Government and Political Science; Unconventional Warfare; *POLITICAL SCIENCE; *URBAN WARFARE; MILITARY OPERATIONS; USSR; MILITARY STRATEGY; *CHECHEN WAR; CHECHNYA; BORIS YELTSIN; Chechen; Russian North
• Online Access: http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA441554; http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA441554

In the fall of 1994 Russia moved inexorably toward armed intervention in Chechnya, a member of the newly formed Russian North Caucasus Federated States. In reviewing Russian national interests for its subsequent insertion of an armed force into Chechnya, it is evident that President Boris Yeltsin failed to take into account numerous environmental factors. Consideration of these factors and careful analysis of them should have resulted in the Russians pursuing alternative means in the pursuit of their vital interests. Boris Yeltsin's subordination of Russian national interests to consolidating his sagging political support at home set the stage for an unnecessary military intervention in Chechnya that, combined with a flawed military strategy, was doomed to failure from the onset.