Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses?
"Economic game experiments have become a prominent method among social scientists developing and testing theories of cooperation. These games provide a valuable opportunity to generate measures of cooperation that can be compared from one place to the next, yet challenges remain in how to inter...
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ftdlc:oai:http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu:10535/9764 2023-05-15T16:58:55+02:00 Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses? Nicolas, Baumard Former Soviet Union Russia 2013 http://hdl.handle.net/10535/9764 English eng http://hdl.handle.net/10535/9764 Current Anthropology 54 144-176 2 April cooperation norms General & Multiple Resources Journal Article published Case Study 2013 ftdlc 2021-03-11T16:19:20Z "Economic game experiments have become a prominent method among social scientists developing and testing theories of cooperation. These games provide a valuable opportunity to generate measures of cooperation that can be compared from one place to the next, yet challenges remain in how to interpret cross-cultural differences in these experiments and connect them to cooperation in naturally occurring contexts. I address these challenges by examining framing effects in public goods games (PGGs) with salmon fishers and reindeer herders in Kamchatka, Russia. Combining standard versions of the game with versions that refer to post-Soviet institutions coordinating fishing and herding, I show that (1) average contributions in the PGG in Kamchatka are substantially higher than reported elsewhere and (2) framing the PGG alters the relationship between contributions and expectations, shifting strategies away from unconditional generosity and toward conditional cooperation. My analysis, by synthesizing quantitative analysis of PGG data with long-term qualitative ethnography, including extensive postgame interviews with participants, supports the notion that cooperation in economic games increases along with cultural norms, values, and institutions that emerge from economic interdependence. Framing effects suggest that researchers should devote more attention to investigating the relationship between contributions and expectations." Article in Journal/Newspaper Kamchatka Indiana University: Digital Library of the Commons (DLC) |
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Open Polar |
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Indiana University: Digital Library of the Commons (DLC) |
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ftdlc |
language |
English |
topic |
cooperation norms General & Multiple Resources |
spellingShingle |
cooperation norms General & Multiple Resources Nicolas, Baumard Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses? |
topic_facet |
cooperation norms General & Multiple Resources |
description |
"Economic game experiments have become a prominent method among social scientists developing and testing theories of cooperation. These games provide a valuable opportunity to generate measures of cooperation that can be compared from one place to the next, yet challenges remain in how to interpret cross-cultural differences in these experiments and connect them to cooperation in naturally occurring contexts. I address these challenges by examining framing effects in public goods games (PGGs) with salmon fishers and reindeer herders in Kamchatka, Russia. Combining standard versions of the game with versions that refer to post-Soviet institutions coordinating fishing and herding, I show that (1) average contributions in the PGG in Kamchatka are substantially higher than reported elsewhere and (2) framing the PGG alters the relationship between contributions and expectations, shifting strategies away from unconditional generosity and toward conditional cooperation. My analysis, by synthesizing quantitative analysis of PGG data with long-term qualitative ethnography, including extensive postgame interviews with participants, supports the notion that cooperation in economic games increases along with cultural norms, values, and institutions that emerge from economic interdependence. Framing effects suggest that researchers should devote more attention to investigating the relationship between contributions and expectations." |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Nicolas, Baumard |
author_facet |
Nicolas, Baumard |
author_sort |
Nicolas, Baumard |
title |
Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses? |
title_short |
Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses? |
title_full |
Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses? |
title_fullStr |
Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses? |
title_sort |
cultural norms: transmitted behaviors or adaptive responses? |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10535/9764 |
op_coverage |
Former Soviet Union Russia |
genre |
Kamchatka |
genre_facet |
Kamchatka |
op_relation |
http://hdl.handle.net/10535/9764 Current Anthropology 54 144-176 2 April |
_version_ |
1766051049629548544 |