Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources

"Fisheries management by individual transferable quotas (ITQ's) is being advocated by several fisheries economists as a solution to 'tragedy of commons' situations in the fisheries. Until lately, the studies of ITQ's have been purely theoretical, but now it is possible to st...

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Main Author: Eythorsson, Einar
Format: Conference Object
Language:unknown
Published: 1995
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10535/551
id ftdlc:oai:http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu:10535/551
record_format openpolar
spelling ftdlc:oai:http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu:10535/551 2023-05-15T16:46:03+02:00 Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources Eythorsson, Einar Europe Iceland 1995 http://hdl.handle.net/10535/551 unknown http://hdl.handle.net/10535/551 Reinventing the Commons, the Fifth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property May 24-28, 1995 Bodoe, Norway IASC common pool resources fisheries ITQs privatization rent seeking Conference Paper unpublished 1995 ftdlc 2021-03-11T16:15:57Z "Fisheries management by individual transferable quotas (ITQ's) is being advocated by several fisheries economists as a solution to 'tragedy of commons' situations in the fisheries. Until lately, the studies of ITQ's have been purely theoretical, but now it is possible to study how the system works in real settings. Two countries, New Zealand and Iceland, have adopted ITQ's as an overall fisheries management system on a national level. In Iceland, fish quotas were made transferable within a set of limitations in 1984, but since 1991, quotas have been freely transferable. The gradual transformation of common property rights into private property rights under the ITQ regime, is basically consistent with the economic theory of ITQ's, though this part of the theory is often undercommunicated in the political rethorics. In the Icelandic case, the theoretical assumption that a ITQ-regime will discourage overinvestment in the fishing fleet seems questionable. The transferability of fishing rights (that is quotas), transforms them into a sort of currency. Thus, the ITQ-regime as such seems to represent a major input of 'new' capital into the fisheries, which in turn generates an incentive for investment. The economic theory of ITQ's also assumes that quota market prices will reflect the resource rent generated by the fisheries under an ITQ-regime. In Iceland the demand for quotas is influenced by unemployment and lack of alternative sources of income for fishermen. The interdependency between the quota market and the labor market is gradually creating a market price of fishermen's labor. This process, along with a rapid concentration of quota ownership is causing an increase in social differences and social conflict." Conference Object Iceland Indiana University: Digital Library of the Commons (DLC) New Zealand
institution Open Polar
collection Indiana University: Digital Library of the Commons (DLC)
op_collection_id ftdlc
language unknown
topic IASC
common pool resources
fisheries
ITQs
privatization
rent seeking
spellingShingle IASC
common pool resources
fisheries
ITQs
privatization
rent seeking
Eythorsson, Einar
Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources
topic_facet IASC
common pool resources
fisheries
ITQs
privatization
rent seeking
description "Fisheries management by individual transferable quotas (ITQ's) is being advocated by several fisheries economists as a solution to 'tragedy of commons' situations in the fisheries. Until lately, the studies of ITQ's have been purely theoretical, but now it is possible to study how the system works in real settings. Two countries, New Zealand and Iceland, have adopted ITQ's as an overall fisheries management system on a national level. In Iceland, fish quotas were made transferable within a set of limitations in 1984, but since 1991, quotas have been freely transferable. The gradual transformation of common property rights into private property rights under the ITQ regime, is basically consistent with the economic theory of ITQ's, though this part of the theory is often undercommunicated in the political rethorics. In the Icelandic case, the theoretical assumption that a ITQ-regime will discourage overinvestment in the fishing fleet seems questionable. The transferability of fishing rights (that is quotas), transforms them into a sort of currency. Thus, the ITQ-regime as such seems to represent a major input of 'new' capital into the fisheries, which in turn generates an incentive for investment. The economic theory of ITQ's also assumes that quota market prices will reflect the resource rent generated by the fisheries under an ITQ-regime. In Iceland the demand for quotas is influenced by unemployment and lack of alternative sources of income for fishermen. The interdependency between the quota market and the labor market is gradually creating a market price of fishermen's labor. This process, along with a rapid concentration of quota ownership is causing an increase in social differences and social conflict."
format Conference Object
author Eythorsson, Einar
author_facet Eythorsson, Einar
author_sort Eythorsson, Einar
title Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources
title_short Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources
title_full Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources
title_fullStr Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources
title_full_unstemmed Theory and Practice of ITQ's in Iceland; Privatisation of Common Fisheries Resources
title_sort theory and practice of itq's in iceland; privatisation of common fisheries resources
publishDate 1995
url http://hdl.handle.net/10535/551
op_coverage Europe
Iceland
geographic New Zealand
geographic_facet New Zealand
genre Iceland
genre_facet Iceland
op_relation http://hdl.handle.net/10535/551
Reinventing the Commons, the Fifth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
May 24-28, 1995
Bodoe, Norway
_version_ 1766036183645683712