Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries...
Main Authors: | , , , |
---|---|
Format: | Text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Unknown
2010
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://dx.doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.59094 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59094 |
id |
ftdatacite:10.22004/ag.econ.59094 |
---|---|
record_format |
openpolar |
spelling |
ftdatacite:10.22004/ag.econ.59094 2023-05-15T15:30:10+02:00 Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro 2010 https://dx.doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.59094 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59094 en eng Unknown Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies Atlantic salmon bioeconomic model coalition formation partition function sharing rules stability analysis article-journal Text ScholarlyArticle 2010 ftdatacite https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.59094 2021-11-05T12:55:41Z This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort. Text Atlantic salmon DataCite Metadata Store (German National Library of Science and Technology) |
institution |
Open Polar |
collection |
DataCite Metadata Store (German National Library of Science and Technology) |
op_collection_id |
ftdatacite |
language |
English |
topic |
Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies Atlantic salmon bioeconomic model coalition formation partition function sharing rules stability analysis |
spellingShingle |
Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies Atlantic salmon bioeconomic model coalition formation partition function sharing rules stability analysis Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation |
topic_facet |
Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies Atlantic salmon bioeconomic model coalition formation partition function sharing rules stability analysis |
description |
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort. |
format |
Text |
author |
Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro |
author_facet |
Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro Kulmala, Soile Levontin, Polina Lindroos, Marko Pintassilgo, Pedro |
author_sort |
Kulmala, Soile |
title |
Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation |
title_short |
Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation |
title_full |
Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation |
title_fullStr |
Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation |
title_sort |
atlantic salmon fishery in the baltic sea – a case of trivial cooperation |
publisher |
Unknown |
publishDate |
2010 |
url |
https://dx.doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.59094 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59094 |
genre |
Atlantic salmon |
genre_facet |
Atlantic salmon |
op_doi |
https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.59094 |
_version_ |
1766360620848906240 |