Extended abstract: Transboundary quota enforcement with an application to the North East Arctic cod fishery ...
No abstracts are to be cited without prior reference to the author.Many fish stocks, as well as other renewable resources, are shared between different countries. Resource management then relies on international agreements and quota enforcement. Much work has been done on whether cooperative managem...
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| Format: | Conference Object |
| Language: | unknown |
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ASC 2012 - Theme session L
2024
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| Online Access: | https://dx.doi.org/10.17895/ices.pub.24974403 https://ices-library.figshare.com/articles/conference_contribution/Extended_abstract_Transboundary_quota_enforcement_with_an_application_to_the_North_East_Arctic_cod_fishery/24974403 |
| Summary: | No abstracts are to be cited without prior reference to the author.Many fish stocks, as well as other renewable resources, are shared between different countries. Resource management then relies on international agreements and quota enforcement. Much work has been done on whether cooperative management is feasible and how and under what conditions such outcomes can be reached. The focus of our study differs from the existing game theoretical work in that we go one step further by asking what happens once a sharing agreement has been established. Does each country in fact impose the conditions of the sharing agreement on their fishing industries by ensuring strict enough enforcement of quotas to meet international obligations? In most, if not all, commercial fisheries, illegal fishing is a serious and significant problem (Agnew, et al., 2009). This is also the case for fisheries in which sharing agreements have been reached, such as the NEA cod fishery, which is shared 50-50 between Norway and Russia ... |
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