Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ...
Action-sentences about states, such as ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’, are ubiquitous in discourse about international relations. Although there has been a great deal of debate in International Relations about whether states are agents or actors, the question of how to interpret action-sente...
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ftdatacite:10.17863/cam.6755 2023-05-15T17:22:26+02:00 Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ... Fleming, Sean 2017 https://dx.doi.org/10.17863/cam.6755 https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/261559 en eng Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository agent–structure problem corporate agency Hobbes metaphor ontology state personhood Article ScholarlyArticle article-journal Text 2017 ftdatacite https://doi.org/10.17863/cam.6755 2023-04-03T12:55:57Z Action-sentences about states, such as ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’, are ubiquitous in discourse about international relations. Although there has been a great deal of debate in International Relations about whether states are agents or actors, the question of how to interpret action-sentences about states has been treated as secondary or epiphenomenal. This article focuses on our practices of speaking and writing about the state rather than the ontology of the state. It uses Hobbes’ theory of attributed action to develop a typology of action-sentences and to analyse action-sentences about states. These sentences are not shorthand for action-sentences about individuals, as proponents of the metaphorical interpretation suggest. Nor do they describe the actions of singular agents, as proponents of the literal interpretation suggest. The central argument is that action-sentences about states are ‘attributive’, much like sentences about principals who act vicariously through agents: they identify the ... : This research was funded by a Doctoral Fellowship (752-2015-0050) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; a Rothermere Fellowship from the Rothermere Foundation; and a J.W. Pickersgill Fellowship from the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. ... Text Newfoundland DataCite Metadata Store (German National Library of Science and Technology) Canada Newfoundland |
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English |
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agent–structure problem corporate agency Hobbes metaphor ontology state personhood |
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agent–structure problem corporate agency Hobbes metaphor ontology state personhood Fleming, Sean Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ... |
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agent–structure problem corporate agency Hobbes metaphor ontology state personhood |
description |
Action-sentences about states, such as ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’, are ubiquitous in discourse about international relations. Although there has been a great deal of debate in International Relations about whether states are agents or actors, the question of how to interpret action-sentences about states has been treated as secondary or epiphenomenal. This article focuses on our practices of speaking and writing about the state rather than the ontology of the state. It uses Hobbes’ theory of attributed action to develop a typology of action-sentences and to analyse action-sentences about states. These sentences are not shorthand for action-sentences about individuals, as proponents of the metaphorical interpretation suggest. Nor do they describe the actions of singular agents, as proponents of the literal interpretation suggest. The central argument is that action-sentences about states are ‘attributive’, much like sentences about principals who act vicariously through agents: they identify the ... : This research was funded by a Doctoral Fellowship (752-2015-0050) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; a Rothermere Fellowship from the Rothermere Foundation; and a J.W. Pickersgill Fellowship from the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. ... |
format |
Text |
author |
Fleming, Sean |
author_facet |
Fleming, Sean |
author_sort |
Fleming, Sean |
title |
Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ... |
title_short |
Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ... |
title_full |
Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ... |
title_fullStr |
Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ... |
title_full_unstemmed |
Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states ... |
title_sort |
artificial persons and attributed actions: how to interpret action-sentences about states ... |
publisher |
Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository |
publishDate |
2017 |
url |
https://dx.doi.org/10.17863/cam.6755 https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/261559 |
geographic |
Canada Newfoundland |
geographic_facet |
Canada Newfoundland |
genre |
Newfoundland |
genre_facet |
Newfoundland |
op_doi |
https://doi.org/10.17863/cam.6755 |
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1766109078915907584 |