REALPOLITIK AND THE RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR: THREE YEARS ON

• Main Authors: Desseyn, Ryan, Tchantouridzé, Lasha
• Format: Text
• Language: unknown
• Published: Central Asia & Central Caucasus Press AB 2012
• Subjects: Watchers; North Atlantic
• Online Access: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/realpolitik-and-the-russia-georgia-war-three-years-on; http://cyberleninka.ru/article_covers/14496453.png

In November 2011, in a dramatic departure from the original claims of the Russian troops rescuing the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Tbilisi's genocidal actions, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged the real reason behind the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008. Speaking on 21 November, 2011 at the headquarters of Russia's 58th army of its Southern Military District located in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, Medvedev noted: "If we had faltered in [August] 2008, geopolitical arrangement would be different now and number of countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been there [in NATO] now." This was no slip-up, as Medvedev continued to push this line later on the same day. When interviewed in Rostov on the same day, he further confirmed: "Today I already spoke with the army officers and I will tell it to you too that it was of course a very difficult page in our recent history, but, unfortunately, it was absolutely necessary [decision]. And the fact that Russia's actions at the time were so tough has eventually secured a situation for us, which, despite of all the difficulties, is now quieter than it was. "We have simply calmed some of our neighbors down by showing them that they should behave correctly in respect of Russia and in respect of neighboring small states. And for some of our partners, including for the North Atlantic Alliance, it was a signal that before taking a decision about expansion of the Alliance, one should at first think about the geopolitical stability. I deem these [issues] to be the major lessons of those developments in 2008." Medvedev's acknowledgment validated what most Russia-watchers in the West suspected, but few cared to admit: Russia's war against Georgia was motivated by the age-old realpolitik considerations, and not humanitarian sentiments toward some obscure mountainous peoples. The Russians had apparently decided to stop NATO enlargement by force, and according to Medvedev, the outgoing Russian president, that achievement was a highlight of his presidency. Western allies could respond with nothing of substance, and quietly allowed Moscow to dismember Georgia, the most outspoken pro-American and pro-Western state. This was not the first time when policies of appeasement were offered to an aggressive expansionist state, but it was definitely new for the post-Cold War era. After the fall of the so-called "Evil Empire," most political scientists counted on a peace dividend, whereby standing down from permanent high alert would save on defense costs. However, the outbreak of numerous local and regional conflicts that resulted from newly found freedom from oppressive regimes has presented a far greater challenge than could ever have been expected. Complicating matters were that this supposed peace occurred in a sea of unpredictability that was markedly different than the stability of the bipolar world of the very tense but also predictable Cold War. The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was the result of the confluence of age-old tensions and realpolitik worldviews that were masterfully played in the old capital of the former Evil Empire. Three years after the war, and through an understanding of the historical background, one can see how the confluence of realpolitik and hegemony created a necessity for both the Russians and the Georgians to act the way they did, though Georgia was probably more justified in its actions than Russia. 5 Georgia erred in the planning, timing, and executing its policies and action in the rebel areas, but it was the Russians who violated the international principles of non-intervention and territorial integrity, with world's other great powers turning a blind eye. Russia's attack on Georgia and the subsequent dismemberment of the Georgian state was the first instance since the Cold War of a major power unilaterally attacking and dismembering a smaller neighbor. This sad precedent took place within a context of Russia not even trying to gain a measure of international support for its actions-a new low even for Russia.