Effort rights-based management

• Published in: Fish and Fisheries
• Main Authors: Squirels, Dale, Mauder, Mark, Allen, Robin, Andersen, Peder, Astorkiza, Kepa, Butterworth, Douglas, Caballero, Gonzalo, Clarke, Raymond, Ellefsen, Hans, Guillotreau, Patrice, Hampton, John, Hannesson, Rognvaldu, Havice, Elizabeth, Helvey, Mark, Herrick, Samuel, Hoydal, Kjartan, Maharaj, Vishwanie, Metzner, Rebecca, Mosqueira, Iago, Parma, Ana María, Prieto Bowen, Ivan, Restrepo, Victor, Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi, Steinsham, Stein Ivar, Thunberg, Eric, del Valle, Ikerne, Vestergaard, Niels
• Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
• Language: English
• Published: Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
• Subjects: Catch Rights; Effort Rights; Fisheries Management; Total Allowable Catch; https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4.1; https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4; Butterworth; Caballero; Ellefsen; Faroe Islands; Hampton; Tac; Islas Feroe
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/152990

Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem. Fil: Squirels, Dale. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos Fil: Mauder, Mark. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; Estados Unidos Fil: Allen, Robin. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; Nueva Zelanda Fil: Andersen, Peder. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca Fil: Astorkiza, Kepa. Universidad del País Vasco; España Fil: Butterworth, Douglas. University of Cape Town; Sudáfrica Fil: Caballero, Gonzalo. Universidad de Vigo; España Fil: Clarke, Raymond. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos Fil: Ellefsen, Hans. University of Faroe Islands; Islas Feroe Fil: Guillotreau, Patrice. Universite de Nantes; Francia Fil: Hampton, John. Oceanic Fisheries Programme; Nueva Caledonia Fil: Hannesson, Rognvaldu. Norwegian School of ...