Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.

In the growing literature that shows that higher levels of trade lead to a larger public sector, politics remains prominently absent. As openness increases, the state, acting as a social planner, adopts a salient role to minimize the risks of higher economic integration as well as secure social peac...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Carles Boix, Alícia Adserà
Other Authors: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
Format: Text
Language:English
Subjects:
Online Access:http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.7.5403
http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980029.pdf
id ftciteseerx:oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.7.5403
record_format openpolar
spelling ftciteseerx:oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.7.5403 2023-05-15T16:16:53+02:00 Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness. Carles Boix Alícia Adserà The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives application/pdf http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.7.5403 http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980029.pdf en eng http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.7.5403 http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980029.pdf Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980029.pdf text ftciteseerx 2016-01-08T18:49:57Z In the growing literature that shows that higher levels of trade lead to a larger public sector, politics remains prominently absent. As openness increases, the state, acting as a social planner, adopts a salient role to minimize the risks of higher economic integration as well as secure social peace. Given the highly redistributive nature of both trade and fiscal policies, we claim, however, that the interaction of the international economy and domestic politics may lead to three distinct political-economic equilibria. First, nations may embrace protectionist policies to shore up the welfare of key domestic sectors -- without having to engage, therefore, in substantial public spending. Second, to maintain trade openness in democratic settings, policymakers have to develop publicly-funded compensatory schemes to muster the support of the losers of higher economic integration. Finally, given the tax burden of public compensation, pro-free trade sectors may resort to impose an authoritarian regime to exclude (instead of buying off) their opponents. After exploring, through a formal model, the conditions under which each of these three regimes emerges, we successfully test the implications of the paper on a sample of around sixty developing and developed nations for the period 1950-1990. In this literature, different institutional structures may distort or slow down the current balance of power of socioeconomic actors (yet without contradicting them permanently). See Garrett and Lange (1996) and also Alt et al. (1996). 1 In exploring the interaction of the international economy and domestic politics, two research agendas stand out in the last years. On the one hand, a first avenue of inquiry has examined how domestic politics determines trade policy and the degree of econo. Text First Nations Unknown
institution Open Polar
collection Unknown
op_collection_id ftciteseerx
language English
description In the growing literature that shows that higher levels of trade lead to a larger public sector, politics remains prominently absent. As openness increases, the state, acting as a social planner, adopts a salient role to minimize the risks of higher economic integration as well as secure social peace. Given the highly redistributive nature of both trade and fiscal policies, we claim, however, that the interaction of the international economy and domestic politics may lead to three distinct political-economic equilibria. First, nations may embrace protectionist policies to shore up the welfare of key domestic sectors -- without having to engage, therefore, in substantial public spending. Second, to maintain trade openness in democratic settings, policymakers have to develop publicly-funded compensatory schemes to muster the support of the losers of higher economic integration. Finally, given the tax burden of public compensation, pro-free trade sectors may resort to impose an authoritarian regime to exclude (instead of buying off) their opponents. After exploring, through a formal model, the conditions under which each of these three regimes emerges, we successfully test the implications of the paper on a sample of around sixty developing and developed nations for the period 1950-1990. In this literature, different institutional structures may distort or slow down the current balance of power of socioeconomic actors (yet without contradicting them permanently). See Garrett and Lange (1996) and also Alt et al. (1996). 1 In exploring the interaction of the international economy and domestic politics, two research agendas stand out in the last years. On the one hand, a first avenue of inquiry has examined how domestic politics determines trade policy and the degree of econo.
author2 The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
format Text
author Carles Boix
Alícia Adserà
spellingShingle Carles Boix
Alícia Adserà
Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.
author_facet Carles Boix
Alícia Adserà
author_sort Carles Boix
title Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.
title_short Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.
title_full Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.
title_fullStr Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.
title_full_unstemmed Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.
title_sort trade, democracy and the size of the public sector: the political underpinnings of openness.
url http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.7.5403
http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980029.pdf
genre First Nations
genre_facet First Nations
op_source http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980029.pdf
op_relation http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.7.5403
http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980029.pdf
op_rights Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.
_version_ 1766002733351960576