Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stability of the cooperative management agreement of the North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries over time, as the stock recovers, assuming that the players were engaged in previous cooperation for a certain period of time. This analysis is focused on the sh...

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Main Authors: Ana Brasão, Faculdade De Economia
Other Authors: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
Format: Text
Language:English
Published: 1999
Subjects:
Online Access:http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.526.935
http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2000/wp377.pdf
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spelling ftciteseerx:oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.526.935 2023-05-15T17:34:48+02:00 Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL Ana Brasão Faculdade De Economia The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives 1999 application/pdf http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.526.935 http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2000/wp377.pdf en eng http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.526.935 http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2000/wp377.pdf Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2000/wp377.pdf Shapley value time consistency Bluefin tuna cooperative games text 1999 ftciteseerx 2016-01-08T10:24:04Z The purpose of this paper is to examine the stability of the cooperative management agreement of the North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries over time, as the stock recovers, assuming that the players were engaged in previous cooperation for a certain period of time. This analysis is focused on the sharing of the total net returns from cooperation using the concept of Shapley value. It is based on simulation and optimization results from a multi-gear age structured bio-economic model both for the East and the West Atlantic and assumes that the nations were initially in cooperation for either 5 or 15 years. In general terms, the results show, as expected, that the net present values from both cooperation and non-cooperation increase as the stock recovers. Nevertheless, the latter increases more than the former and consequently, the net gains from cooperation decrease. More specific results are obtained for the East and West Atlantic. In the former, it is proved that, the net bargaining power decrease and, as a result, the shares of the net gains from cooperation based on the Shapley Value tend to be equalized, that is, we tend to the Nash bargaining solution. In the latter, the bargaining power may increase and the trend for the equality is not clear. In both, cases there are situations in which the cooperative solution is in the core of the game, meaning that no other strategy yields better outcomes for the players. Text North Atlantic Unknown Nash ENVELOPE(-62.350,-62.350,-74.233,-74.233)
institution Open Polar
collection Unknown
op_collection_id ftciteseerx
language English
topic Shapley value
time consistency
Bluefin tuna
cooperative games
spellingShingle Shapley value
time consistency
Bluefin tuna
cooperative games
Ana Brasão
Faculdade De Economia
Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL
topic_facet Shapley value
time consistency
Bluefin tuna
cooperative games
description The purpose of this paper is to examine the stability of the cooperative management agreement of the North Atlantic Bluefin tuna fisheries over time, as the stock recovers, assuming that the players were engaged in previous cooperation for a certain period of time. This analysis is focused on the sharing of the total net returns from cooperation using the concept of Shapley value. It is based on simulation and optimization results from a multi-gear age structured bio-economic model both for the East and the West Atlantic and assumes that the nations were initially in cooperation for either 5 or 15 years. In general terms, the results show, as expected, that the net present values from both cooperation and non-cooperation increase as the stock recovers. Nevertheless, the latter increases more than the former and consequently, the net gains from cooperation decrease. More specific results are obtained for the East and West Atlantic. In the former, it is proved that, the net bargaining power decrease and, as a result, the shares of the net gains from cooperation based on the Shapley Value tend to be equalized, that is, we tend to the Nash bargaining solution. In the latter, the bargaining power may increase and the trend for the equality is not clear. In both, cases there are situations in which the cooperative solution is in the core of the game, meaning that no other strategy yields better outcomes for the players.
author2 The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
format Text
author Ana Brasão
Faculdade De Economia
author_facet Ana Brasão
Faculdade De Economia
author_sort Ana Brasão
title Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL
title_short Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL
title_full Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL
title_fullStr Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL
title_full_unstemmed Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application to the Shapley Value. Working Paper nº 354, FEUNL
title_sort management of northern atlantic bluefin tuna: an application to the shapley value. working paper nº 354, feunl
publishDate 1999
url http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.526.935
http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2000/wp377.pdf
long_lat ENVELOPE(-62.350,-62.350,-74.233,-74.233)
geographic Nash
geographic_facet Nash
genre North Atlantic
genre_facet North Atlantic
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