(NSF CAREER SES 0552089), and the Jindal Chair and Provost’s Distinguished Professorship at UT
Dallas. All views and errors are ours and not those of the underwriters. MARKET-POLITICAL AMBIDEXTERITY DURING INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS In emerging economies undergoing institutional transitions, while market forces have grown, government influences are not necessarily in decline. Therefore, in add...
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| Format: | Text |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.258.5393 http://www.utdallas.edu/%7Emxp059000/documents/AmbidexterityLiPengMacaulay_1211_final.pdf |
| Summary: | Dallas. All views and errors are ours and not those of the underwriters. MARKET-POLITICAL AMBIDEXTERITY DURING INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS In emerging economies undergoing institutional transitions, while market forces have grown, government influences are not necessarily in decline. Therefore, in addition to market capabilities, firms also need to develop political and nonmarket capabilities. We argue that firms grow during institutional transitions by developing a set of capabilities that we label market-political ambidexterity to embrace both governments and markets. Viewing market-political ambidexterity as a bundle of dynamic capabilities, we contribute to the literature by articulating this important but previously underexplored construct. [Key words] Ambidexterity, market-political ambidexterity, institutional transitions, emerging economies 1 In 1996, Royal Dutch Shell struck an advantageous deal to obtain a 55 % stake in the Sakhalin oil fields in Eastern Russia. This was a result of Shell’s superior technological and market capabilities and Russia’s need for revenue during difficult institutional transitions. By 2000, the picture had changed. Russia’s power was considerably stronger, and Shell had mismanaged local stakeholders and governments by |
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