Executive Summary A National Marines Fisheries Service Technical Group of Experts was assembled to give advice

• Main Authors: Prepared Glenn Mitchell, Steven Peterson, Robert Willig, Ani Katchova
• Other Authors: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
• Format: Text
• Language: English
• Subjects: Ocean quahog
• Online Access: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.224.7746; http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1122/part3.pdf

on the appropriate excessive share threshold for the Surfclam and Ocean Quahog (SCOQ) ITQ system. The report prepared by Mitchell, Peterson, and Willig provides background information on the SCOQ industry and recommendations on 1) the rule or process that can be used to set an excessive-share limit in terms of the maximum percentage of quota that can be owned or otherwise controlled by a single individual or entity; and 2) the application of this rule or process using available data to determine an appropriate excessive-share limit in the SCOQ ITQ system. The NMFS technical group argues that the evidence they analyzed does not support a conclusion that market power is currently being exercised through withholding of quota in the SCOQ fisheries. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index which is recommended for use in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it is found that the levels of concentration vary in the different sectors of the SCOQ industry: quota ownership, harvesting, and processing. The ownership of quota in the SCOQ fisheries is unconcentrated, but the use of quota is highly concentrated, both for harvesting and processing. The excessive-share proposal is laid out as a series of seven steps. They consider the HHI index using non-SCOQ clams and fringe holders, and the rule of three-firms to ensure adequate