| Summary: | Since 1936 Australia has claimed 42% of the Antarctic continent, a claim that is only acknowledged by four other nations on Earth. With the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 all nations involved in the Antarctic agreed to put aside their claims in the name of scientific discovery and since then the area has remained free from any major international discord or territorial dispute. However, recent claims to Exclusive Economic Zones by Australia and Britain have reignited issues of sovereignty, and as resources diminish and technology improves, the question of how long the peace will last has to be asked. For the first part of this report I explored the five most likely scenarios I believed could lead to potential conflict in Antarctica. I did this not to be alarmist but simply to predict the nature of any possible conflict so as to best recommend what actions needed to be taken by Australia to be prepared. The first scenario was a direct counter claim to either territory within, or the whole of, the Australian Antarctic Territory. Considering so few nations acknowledge Australia's claim as legitimate it is certainly plausible to imagine, for instance, China or Russia arguing that the settlements they have maintained within the AA T for decades are more their sovereign territory than Australia's. Secondly, Australia's attempt to exploit its claim could spark fierce objection from any number of parties who see the Antarctic as an area belonging to mankind and not falling under the sovereignty of any one nation. A third scenario is based upon the increasing tensions among Argentina, Britain, and Chile and the possibility this could somehow eventually involve Australia. While Australia would not have any direct interest in physically involving itself, it is not hard to imagine how a conflict on one side of the Antarctic continent could have an impact on the security on the other. The fourth scenario highlights the ambiguity caused by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the potential weakness this reveals in the Antarctic Treaty. As deep sea bed mining becomes technologically and economically more feasible there is an increasing likelihood that some nations may attempt to take advantage of this 'loophole' to mine in Antarctic waters. The probability that this could spark an international dispute is high. Finally, the fifth scenario is concerned primarily with illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU) which has already proven to be a major concern for Australian economic interests. Although none of the five scenarios indicate an immediate threat of erupting into interstate conflict, all have the ability to increase tensions in the region and place strain on the Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty specifically prohibits any military activity south of 60°S latitude and this makes any military assessment of capabilities in the region difficult, but not impossible and certainly not unnecessary. The army would have only a limited role within any Antarctic conflict as there would be few land based targets, minimal land based opposition, and excessive costs and logistical support required to maintain an Antarctic land army. The Navy however would probably play a lead role and would therefore require the most significant attention to its capabilities in the region. Extreme weather conditions significantly limit the functionality of the current fleet and the feasibility of creating a purpose built warship needs to be investigated. There are a number of vessels that can survive Southern Ocean conditions but very few can maintain offensive capabilities in the rough seas that usually occur. The Air Force faces similar environmental restrictions as well as problems of distance. Ultimately though, Australia's most potent offensive capabilities in the region will come from the RAAF, and with the impending purchase of UAV's it is plausible to speculate it could also take over a great deal of surveillance operations if the appropriate assets were allocated accordingly. All RAAF operations are inhibited primarily by cost and at present there is little political will to concentrate ADF capabilities on Australia's southern territories. Despite this, these forces are there should the situation require them. With the exception of perhaps the United States, Australia would have the strongest military capabilities in the AA T if an interstate conflict were to erupt tomorrow. However, the ADF has severe limitations in this environment and there are a number of nations that could feasibly overtake Australia in this respect if sufficient national interest urged them to. Ultimately no recent Australian government has seen Antarctica as a significant defence issue and subsequently the ADF would be under prepared for a large scale conflict in the region. ADF personnel would require extensive specialised training and equipment, and there is little in the way of logistics or infrastructure to support a major military campaign. In the face of large budget deficits it appears unlikely that excessive funds could be contributed to change this, but the recognition of Australian deficiency in this area needs to be realised by defence planners to ensure there is at least some physical deterrent to any direct challenge of Australian Sovereignty.
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