STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES

This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries that attempts to capture the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, the two main species in the habitat. The aim is to analyze joint (cooperative) versus separate (noncooperative) management of this predator-prey sys...

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Main Author: Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Published: AgEcon Search 1997
Subjects:
Online Access:http://purl.umn.edu/28138
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spelling ftagecon:oai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:28138 2023-05-15T15:38:41+02:00 STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES Sumaila, Ussif Rashid 1997 18 application/pdf http://purl.umn.edu/28138 English en eng AgEcon Search Marine Resource Economics>Volume 12, Number 2, 1997 14930 http://purl.umn.edu/28138 Research Methods/ Statistical Methods Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Journal Article 1997 ftagecon 2012-09-12T16:24:39Z This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries that attempts to capture the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, the two main species in the habitat. The aim is to analyze joint (cooperative) versus separate (noncooperative) management of this predator-prey system with a view to isolating the efficiency loss due to separate management. Using a game theoretic framework and a multicohort age-structured biomodel, we compute joint and separate management equilibrium outcomes of the model, and investigate the effects of changes in economic parameters on the computed results. In this way, we explore the economic consequences of the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, and the externalities due to noncooperation. Results of the study tend to suggest that (i) under current market conditions, it is economically optimal to exploit both species (rather than just one of them) under joint management; (ii) in comparison with the separate management outcome, a severe reduction of the capelin fishery is called for under joint management; and (iii) the loss in discounted economic rent resulting from the externalities due to the natural interactions between the species is significant, reaching up to almost a quarter of what is achievable under separate management. Article in Journal/Newspaper Barents Sea AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics Barents Sea
institution Open Polar
collection AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics
op_collection_id ftagecon
language English
topic Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy
spellingShingle Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES
topic_facet Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy
description This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries that attempts to capture the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, the two main species in the habitat. The aim is to analyze joint (cooperative) versus separate (noncooperative) management of this predator-prey system with a view to isolating the efficiency loss due to separate management. Using a game theoretic framework and a multicohort age-structured biomodel, we compute joint and separate management equilibrium outcomes of the model, and investigate the effects of changes in economic parameters on the computed results. In this way, we explore the economic consequences of the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, and the externalities due to noncooperation. Results of the study tend to suggest that (i) under current market conditions, it is economically optimal to exploit both species (rather than just one of them) under joint management; (ii) in comparison with the separate management outcome, a severe reduction of the capelin fishery is called for under joint management; and (iii) the loss in discounted economic rent resulting from the externalities due to the natural interactions between the species is significant, reaching up to almost a quarter of what is achievable under separate management.
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
author_facet Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
author_sort Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
title STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES
title_short STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES
title_full STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES
title_fullStr STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES
title_full_unstemmed STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES
title_sort strategic dynamic interaction: the case of barents sea fisheries
publisher AgEcon Search
publishDate 1997
url http://purl.umn.edu/28138
geographic Barents Sea
geographic_facet Barents Sea
genre Barents Sea
genre_facet Barents Sea
op_relation Marine Resource Economics>Volume 12, Number 2, 1997
14930
http://purl.umn.edu/28138
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