STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES
This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries that attempts to capture the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, the two main species in the habitat. The aim is to analyze joint (cooperative) versus separate (noncooperative) management of this predator-prey sys...
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ftagecon:oai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:28138 2023-05-15T15:38:41+02:00 STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES Sumaila, Ussif Rashid 1997 18 application/pdf http://purl.umn.edu/28138 English en eng AgEcon Search Marine Resource Economics>Volume 12, Number 2, 1997 14930 http://purl.umn.edu/28138 Research Methods/ Statistical Methods Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Journal Article 1997 ftagecon 2012-09-12T16:24:39Z This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries that attempts to capture the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, the two main species in the habitat. The aim is to analyze joint (cooperative) versus separate (noncooperative) management of this predator-prey system with a view to isolating the efficiency loss due to separate management. Using a game theoretic framework and a multicohort age-structured biomodel, we compute joint and separate management equilibrium outcomes of the model, and investigate the effects of changes in economic parameters on the computed results. In this way, we explore the economic consequences of the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, and the externalities due to noncooperation. Results of the study tend to suggest that (i) under current market conditions, it is economically optimal to exploit both species (rather than just one of them) under joint management; (ii) in comparison with the separate management outcome, a severe reduction of the capelin fishery is called for under joint management; and (iii) the loss in discounted economic rent resulting from the externalities due to the natural interactions between the species is significant, reaching up to almost a quarter of what is achievable under separate management. Article in Journal/Newspaper Barents Sea AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics Barents Sea |
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Open Polar |
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AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics |
op_collection_id |
ftagecon |
language |
English |
topic |
Research Methods/ Statistical Methods Resource /Energy Economics and Policy |
spellingShingle |
Research Methods/ Statistical Methods Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Sumaila, Ussif Rashid STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES |
topic_facet |
Research Methods/ Statistical Methods Resource /Energy Economics and Policy |
description |
This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries that attempts to capture the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, the two main species in the habitat. The aim is to analyze joint (cooperative) versus separate (noncooperative) management of this predator-prey system with a view to isolating the efficiency loss due to separate management. Using a game theoretic framework and a multicohort age-structured biomodel, we compute joint and separate management equilibrium outcomes of the model, and investigate the effects of changes in economic parameters on the computed results. In this way, we explore the economic consequences of the predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, and the externalities due to noncooperation. Results of the study tend to suggest that (i) under current market conditions, it is economically optimal to exploit both species (rather than just one of them) under joint management; (ii) in comparison with the separate management outcome, a severe reduction of the capelin fishery is called for under joint management; and (iii) the loss in discounted economic rent resulting from the externalities due to the natural interactions between the species is significant, reaching up to almost a quarter of what is achievable under separate management. |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid |
author_facet |
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid |
author_sort |
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid |
title |
STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES |
title_short |
STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES |
title_full |
STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES |
title_fullStr |
STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES |
title_full_unstemmed |
STRATEGIC DYNAMIC INTERACTION: THE CASE OF BARENTS SEA FISHERIES |
title_sort |
strategic dynamic interaction: the case of barents sea fisheries |
publisher |
AgEcon Search |
publishDate |
1997 |
url |
http://purl.umn.edu/28138 |
geographic |
Barents Sea |
geographic_facet |
Barents Sea |
genre |
Barents Sea |
genre_facet |
Barents Sea |
op_relation |
Marine Resource Economics>Volume 12, Number 2, 1997 14930 http://purl.umn.edu/28138 |
_version_ |
1766369935330639872 |